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TESTING THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT:
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
REPRODUCTIVE
MATERIALS AND SERVICES©
By MICHAEL TREBILCOCK,* MELODY MARTIN, ANNE LAWSON, AND
.PENNEY LEwIS**

This article examines the cases for and against
commercializing, or "commodifying," reproductive
materials and services. Using a supply/demand thirdparty framework, three basic scenarios in which
relationships may be
commercial-exchange
possible-exchange of gametes and zygotes, exchange
of gestational services, and exchange of fetal
material-and the major parties of interest, or
stakeholders, are identified. The study sketches the
liberal, essentialist, and radical contingency theories
that shape the debate over the commercialization of
reproductive materials and services. The article then
attempts to derive some basic governing principles that
reflect as much common ground as possible amongst
these various normative perspectives, while recognizing
that complete reconciliation is impossible. Taken
together, these principles are designed to reflect a
strategy of "constrained commodification," where
commercialization or commodification, that is, financial
remuneration, plays a relatively neutral role in the
utilization of reproductive materials and services. In
light of these principles, the article concludes by
sketching legal and regulatory regimes with respect to
the exchange of gametes and zygotes, gestational
services, and fetal tissue.

Cet article examine les arguments pour et contre la
commercialisation (ou la commodification) des services
et des mat6riaux de reproduction. Tout en prenant
conscience d'une structure bas6e sur l'offre et ]a
demande et une troisiame partie, on peut identifier
trois scenarios de base dans lesquels les relations
d'6change commercial seraient possibles-l'6change
des gametes et des zygotes, l'6change des services de
gestation, et l'6change du tissu fetal. Aussi, on peut
identifier les parties majeures int6ressdes--ceux pour
qui beaucoup est en jeu. Cette 6tude esquisse les
th6ories lib6rale, essentialiste, et radicale de
contingence, qui fagonnent la discussion sur la
commercialisation des services et des mat6riaux de
r~production. Ensuite, Farticle essaie de driver des
principes de base gouvernants qui refl~teraient un
point de rapprochement parmi ces perspectives
normatives varides-tout en se rendant compte qu'une
r6conciliation totale est impossible. Vus ensemble, ces
refl6ter une stratdgie de "la
principes tiennent
commodification contrainte," oil la commercialisation
ou Ia commodification, ce qui veut dire la r~mun~ration
financiare, joue un r6le plut8t neutre dans l'emploi des
services et des mat~iaux de r6production. Vus ces
principes, I'article conclut par esquisser des r6gimes
lgaux et r~gulatoires qui gouvemeraient l'Echange des
gametes et des zygotes, des services de gestation, et du
tissu fbetal.
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I. COMMODIFICATION
The recent emergence of a wide range of technologies1 for the
manipulation of reproductive materials has sparked massive ethical
controversies. 2 Many of these technologies in their present or future
forms challenge traditional conceptions of the family by making possible
the radical transformation of parental, familial, and social relationships.
One key question, which engages sharply divergent views, is whether the
new reproductive technologies perpetuate and reinforce negative gender
stereotypes about the role of women in contemporary society-viewed
from the perspectives of women using these technologies to address
problems of infertility, and of women who provide reproductive
materials or services to those requiring them to facilitate reproduction.
The use of new technologies for non-reproductive purposes, for
example, the use of fetal material for the treatment of degenerative

1

This term includes, among others, artificial insemination by husband (insemination with the
sperm of a male partner); donor insemination (insemination with the sperm of a man who is not
anticipating becoming the social father of the resulting child); ovum donation (stimulation of
increased production of ova, and removal of ova from one woman for use by another woman);
gamete intra-fallopian transfer (injection of sperm directly into the fallopian tube, where
fertilization takes place); in vitro fertilization (extracorporeal fertilization of ova, producing a
conceptus for subsequent transfer into the female body); zygote intra-fallopian transfer (transfer of
the conceptus into the fallopian tube); and zygote donation (donation of a zygote to persons who do
not provide genetic material to create the zygote). Zygote gestation and transfer and what we term
pre-conception agreements are variations on what is known as "surrogacy." These will be discussed
further below. Techniques for the medical application of fetal tissues and organs for therapeutic
purposes will also be included under the rubric of "technologies," although, while fetal material is a
"reproductive material," it is not used for reproductive purposes in this context. It is also important
to note that the current state of technology is such that sperm can be cryopreserved ("frozen") but
ova cannot. However, for the purposes of our analysis, we will hypothesize that a method for the
preservation of ova will be devised. For extensive descriptions of these technologies, see Proceed
with Care: Final Report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (Ottawa:
Minister of Government Services, 1993) at c. 18-23 [hereinafter Royal Commission].
2 For an overview of these controversies, see Royal Commission, ibid. at c. 2 and 3.
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diseases such as Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases,3 and for genetic
research, also invokes a range of competing viewpoints, as does the use
of technologies for the purposes of genetic research, gender selection,
and genetic manipulation.
As if these controversies were not intense enough, an additional
level of controversy is introduced when the focus is narrowed from the
desirability of the technologies per se to the issue of commodification of
reproductive materials. The issue of commodification requires
consideration of the possible range of mechanisms that could be adopted
to induce the supply of reproductive materials, 4 on the one hand, and to
allocate the materials, with their associated technologies, to recipients,
on the other hand. The threshold question of whether there should be a
role for market or exchange processes on either the supply or demand
side of these technologies implicates broader and long-standing debates
over what resources or attributes should be "commodified." In other
words, what is the legitimate domain of the market?
Margaret Jane Radin, in a widely noted article, 5 identifies a
spectrum of views on this issue. This spectrum ranges from scholars
such as Karl Marx, who favoured universal non-commodification, to
many classical liberals and neo-classical economists, who view all
resources and attributes as, in principle, commodifiable (universal
commodification). Between these two extremes are a wide and rich
variety of viewpoints that would permit some resources and attributes to
be commodified, but would prohibit the commodification of other
resources or attributes altogether. Yet another range of views would
identify some set of resources or attributes with respect to which only
partial commodification should be permitted, such that market
exchanges would only be permitted subject to substantial legal
3 The issue of commodifying fetal material raises questions as to whether there is, or may in
future be, a shortage of this material. Some commentators cite the number of elective abortions
currently performed and the growing use of laboratory methods to replicate fetal cells as an
indication that demand will not outstrip supply. See, for example, B.R. Burlingame,
"Commercialization in Fetal-Tissue Transplantation: Steering Medical Progress to Ethical Cures"
(1989) 68 Tex. L. Rev. 213 at 239. On the other hand, others argue that the huge number of
potential medical and research applications for fetal tissue indicate that demand may soon exceed
the current supply, resulting in a shortage of fetal tissue similar to the shortage of organs available
for donation. See, for example, M.W. Danis, "Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient
Designation" (1988) 39 Hastings L.. 1079 at 1106; J.S. Bregman, "Conceiving to Abort and Donate
Fetal Tissue: New Ethical Strains in the Transplantation Field-A Survey of Existing Law and a
Proposal for Change" (1989) 36 U.C.LA. L Rev. 1167 at 1187; and J.M. Hillebrecht, "Regulating
the Clinical Uses of Fetal Tissue: A Proposal for Legislation" (1989) 10 J. Legal Med. 269 at 290.
4 For our purposes, "reproductive materials" include gametes, zygotes, and fetal tissue.
5 "Market Inalienability" (1987) 100 Harv. L Rev. 1849.
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constraints. In some cases, lines must be drawn between market and
non-market domains, but in other cases, the central question is the
appropriate choice of legal and related constraints to confine, structure,
and channel private exchange activities so as to realize whatever
advantages markets hold in particular contexts, while minimizing their
most dysfunctional or objectionable features.
This paper will address the commodification dimension of
controversies over the new reproductive technologies and technologies
for the use of fetal material; accordingly, it is important to begin with a
clear definition of "commodification." In its simplest form, this term
implies the exchange of a good or service for money or similar benefit.
It does not a priori imply any pejorative or other connotation. Those
persons who believe that the mere alienation of reproductive material or
services, whether for remuneration or not, is objectionable in its own
right, will find commodification a fortiori objectionable. Indeed, this is
the position taken in some of the theoretical perspectives described in
Section II below. However, if commodification is equated with
alienability more generally, we would be required to evaluate the
desirability of the new reproductive technologies perse, which is not the
primary focus of this paper. In order to focus on the special or sui
generis moral problems introduced by commercialization of relevant
relationships or interactions, we are largely required to assume the
existence, and possibility of non-commercial utilization, of the
underlying technologies. Accordingly, for present purposes, we will
adopt the narrower definition of commodification, equating the term
"commodification" with commercialization, which will largely confine
our study to an examination of exchanges in which remuneration is
involved.
It is important to keep in mind the different inducement effects
that may be associated with payment for reproductive and fetal material:
1. The prospect of financial remuneration could induce the creation
of material that would not otherwise have been created. In this
case, individuals desiring remuneration will accept de novo
medical and psychological risks (for example, a woman who
participates as a "surrogate mother," or "provides gestational
services, ' '6 or a woman who conceives a fetus with the intention
6 A long and intense debate has been provoked by the question of what it is that the
"surrogate" mother is providing. Elizabeth Anderson suggests that it is fallacious to speak of buying

a woman's gestational "services" in the same manner as it is incorrect to speak of buying a baker's
bread-baking "services." Clearly in the latter case one buys the bread as a piece of property: "Is
Women's Labour a Commodity?" (1990) 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 71 at 78. Many object to gestational
service sales agreements on these grounds, claiming that they are "baby-selling" arrangements and,
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of aborting it and selling the fetal material).
2. Offers of financial remuneration could induce individuals to part
with material that was already created for other purposes 7 (for
example, a fetus from a natural pregnancy or "spare" gametes or
zygotes from an rvi procedure (in vitro fertilization). The risks
involved in creating the material would already have been
assumed for other reasons. Two sub-categories of situations
should be identified here:
(a) The supplier could have already intended to part with the
material and have no other use for it (for example, a woman
who was planning an abortion, or a couple who was planning
to donate "spare" zygotes). Here, the additional risks
involved in parting with the material would be taken in any
event.
(b) The supplier did not intend to part with the material before
being confronted with the prospect of financial remuneration
(for example, a woman who was planning to sustain the
pregnancy, or was planning to keep the spare zygotes and try
to implant them in a later cycle). In this situation, the
supplier will have been induced to bear the risks of parting
with the material and to forego the risks and benefits of
continuing with the original use that she had in mind for the
material (for example, the risks of sustaining the pregnancy
to term, or the risks associated with the implantation of
zygotes, and the benefits of potentially producing a child).
For the purposes of this paper, three basic exchange scenarios
are identified by reference to the type of material or service that is being
exchanged: (1) the exchange of gametes and zygotes; (2) the sale of
gestational services; and (3) the sale of fetal tissue. These groupings are
consequently, ought to be prohibited by law. Even if gestational service agreements are held to
involve the sale of babies, however, this conclusion is not determinative for some proponents of
such arrangements who have advocated the merits of a legal system authoizing the sale of babies.
See, for example, K. Selick, "The Case for Baby Buying" (February 1991) Can. Law. 44; and E.M.
Landes & R.A. Posner, "The Economics of the Baby Shortage" (1978) 7 J. Legal Stud. 323. Other
than "baby-selling" and "surrogacy" arrangements, gestational service agreements have sometimes
been referred to as "womb rental" agreements (see K.M. Sly, "Baby-Sitting Consideration:
Surrogate Mother's Right to 'Rent Her Womb' for a Fee" (1983) 18 Gonz. L. Rev. 539), as
agreements to transfer "parental rights" (see Baby M appeal, infra note 8 at 46), or, in the extreme,
as "slavery" (see L. Stone, "Neoslavery-'Surrogate' Motherhood Contracts v. The Thirteenth
Amendment" (1988) 6 Law & Ineq. J. 63; and A.L Allen, "Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership
of Life" (1990) 13 Harv.J.L & Pub. Pol'y 139).
7This example would not apply to "surrogacy" cases because in these cases the agreement is
made before conception, and the risks associated with conception and pregnancy are incurred as a
result of the agreement.
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based on the type of material or service being commodified rather than
on the particular technology employed to procure or create the material:
certain technologies may be employed in more than one type of
exchange. In the gestational services context, use of different techniques
makes it possible for a woman providing gestational services to gestate
either her own ova (fertilized by the commissioning man's sperm), or
another woman's ova (supplied, for example, by a female commissioner,
and fertilized by sperm from her partner or a male "donor"/supplier).
We term the first example a "Pre-Conception Agreement," and the
second a "Zygote Gestation and Transfer Agreement."'8
The above discussion addresses exchanges between persons or
interests who could be termed "parties" to the exchange, acting as
suppliers or demanders. But there is also another category of interests
which we characterize as "third parties," who fall outside the supplier/
demander dichotomy yet are strongly affected by commercial exchanges
of reproductive materials and services. Situated within this category are,
first, "family interests." This group would include the partners
(homosexual or heterosexual) and other children of donors and
recipients. Friends and members of the extended family would also be
included. A second group would include the fetus or child resulting
from the use of the technology in question. The topic of fetal "interests"
is highly controversial, but it would seem that, at a minimum, a fetus is
entitled to some measure of respect by virtue of its having had the
potential to become a human being. It is clear that other parties must
take the fetus's or child's interests into consideration since the fetus or
child is the subject of, rather than a participant in, an exchange
transaction. Future sexual partners of children created using donor
gametes, i.e., partners who might possibly have been created by gametes
8 To date, what we have termed pre-conception agreements have predominated. These have
received the greatest public attention, particularly in the controversial case Re Baby M, 525 A.2d
1128 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. 1987) [hereinafter Baby M trial]; 537 A.2d. 1227 (NJ. 1988) [hereinafter
Baby M appeal]). However, zygote gestation and transfer agreements may be becoming more
common: see C. Lawson, "Couples' Own Embryos Used In Birth Surrogacy" The New York Tunes
(12 August 1990) 1. This type of arrangement was exemplified in the recent case of Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). Some. feminists would argue that, for the purposes of a discussion
of commodification, differentiation between the two situations is unnecessary and artificial. These
theorists argue that a woman's body behaves no differently if the implanted conceptus is genetically
unrelated to herself and that to impose a genetically-centred notion of motherhood is to impose
upon women the male experience of fatherhood, where paternity is argued to be substantially
derived from genetic ties. See, for example, B.K. Rothman, RecreatingMotherhood Ideology and
Technology in a PatriarchalSociety (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989) [hereinafter Recreating
Motherhood]. See also, W. Chavkin, B.K. Rothman & R. Rapp, "Alternative Modes of
Reproduction: Other Views and Questions" in S. Cohen & N. Taub, eds., Reproductive Lawsfor the
1990s (Clifton, NJ.: Humana Press, 1989) 405.
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from the same donor, would also fall into this category. A third group
would comprise those responsible for selecting, manipulating, and
storing reproductive material. This group, which might be called
"facilitating parties," includes the doctors of the supplier and demander
(who are responsible for the health and best interests of the parties), and
medical personnel who arrange for production of the reproductive or
fetal material. Technicians and operators of facilities that transport and
store reproductive and fetal material would also be included in this
category, as would for-profit fetal tissue processing companies. A fourth
group is comprised of what might be called "moral interests." Its
membership would include individuals and associations (such as
women's groups and religious organizations) that have beliefs about how
reproductive material and fetal material ought to be used in our society.
Some technologies will concern a greater number of interests than will
others, although all commercial exchanges will affect parties in all four
groups.
A final background issue is the controversial topic of infertility.
The question of whether supply of and demand for reproductive
materials and services ought to be promoted in this context implicates
current understandings of the nature, prevalence, treatment, and
possible social responses to infertility. Some aspects of the controversy
are scientific, in that there appears to be no clear medical consensus on
the precise incidence, causes, and in some cases cures for infertility.
While the number of people visiting fertility clinics in the United States
has tripled over the last twenty years, and each year approximately 2.4
million couples seek medical help for infertility, 9 the scientific evidence
does not seem to support the widely-held perception that the incidence
of infertility is increasing. 10 In Canada, three recent surveys found that
the infertility rate for couples who had cohabited without using
contraception for a one year period was approximately 8.5 per cent
(some 300,000 couples), while the infertility rate after two years was
approximately 7 per cent (about 250,000 couples). 11 While sexually
transmitted diseases are a significant cause of infertility, many other
12
causes of infertility remain unknown.
However, it bears noting that the definition of infertility, which
in medical contexts is often defined as inability to conceive naturally
9 See K. Banks, "Baby Chase" (May/June 1991) 57 Equinox 76 at 78.
lORoyal Commission, supra note 1 at 192.
11

Ibid at 180.
12 Ibid. at 175-77.
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over a one-year period, is somewhat arbitrary due to the fact that some
couples are able to conceive naturally given a time period longer than
one year.13 Moreover, it can reasonably be argued that the concept of
infertility, like other so-called disabilities, is not, and should not be,
exclusively a medical issue; the extent to which particular physical
limitations should be regarded as disabilities requiring or justifying
medical responses is to some extent a matter of social construction. In
other words, a society collectively may acknowledge that some causes of
infertility can be prevented and some can be cured, and must determine
whether or not some should be responded to through new reproductive
technologies, or whether some perhaps should, or must, be lived with.
The question of the appropriate allocation of social resources to the
prevention and treatment of the causes of infertility, and the potential
use of new reproductive technologies as a substitute for or complement
to physiological "cures" for infertility is clearly an important underlying
14
issue in the commodification debate.
The organizational structure of this paper is as follows. In
Section II, we sketch a range of major normative perspectives that
appear to drive debates over the appropriate scope and role for
commercialization of reproductive materials procured or created using
the new reproductive technologies. Three of these perspectives are
individualistically-oriented liberal theories unified by a common
commitment to individual conceptions of the "good life": these are
autonomy, utilitarian-efficiency, and distributive justice theories. These
perspectives are contrasted with theories that are loosely grouped under
the rubric of "essentialism," which implies that human nature or
community values possess an essence or core with which individual
choices about use of reproductive materials and technologies must be
reconciled. In turn, liberal and essentialist theories are both contrasted
with a set of radical contingency theories, which hold that the
contingencies of history, culture, society, politics, and economics have
combined to generate systemic inequalities (particularly for women),
which, in our current social order, could potentially be exacerbated by
the use of reproductive materials, services, and technologies. As these
theories are addressed, the nature of their salience in the context of the
three exchange scenarios (gametes and zygotes, gestational services, and
fetal tissue) will be explored. Certain strengths and weaknesses within
13 For this reason, the Royal Commission recommends that infertility be assessed on the basis
of a two-year period: ib4d at 188.
14 For a discussion of this issue from a feminist perspective, see, for example, Recreating
Motherhood, supra note 8 at 140ff.; and Royal Commission, ibid at 170-75.
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each theory and major points of convergence and divergence among
them will be noted, although clearly anything approaching complete
reconciliation of these perspectives is impossible. Various aspects of
these normative perspectives will be drawn upon in Section III, where
four general principles-the Principle of Uniqueness, the Principle of
Enablement (not Inducement), the Principle of Constrained Choice, and
the Principle of Fair Access-will be developed and explained. These
principles reflect our best efforts at a coherent synthesis of the more
compelling aspects of these perspectives. In Section IV, these governing
principles will be brought to bear on the three categories of potential
exchange activities identified in Section I, and possible legal and
regulatory frameworks that seem to be implied by these principles will
be briefly explored.
II. NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES
A. Introduction
In clarifying the nature of the normative conflicts over the
commercialization of reproductive materials and services, we think that
it is useful to develop a basic taxonomy of these perspectives, even at the
risk of oversimplification, to illuminate the general orientation of these
perspectives towards the phenomena of concern to us. Apart from the
risk of oversimplification, we also recognize that there is a risk that some
perspectives or viewpoints do not fit neatly into the categories that we
present below, but reflect instead a more nuanced combination of more
than one perspective. For example, the Royal Commission on New
Reproductive Technologies chose to adopt a perspective termed "the
ethic of care," which includes eight principles: individual autonomy,
equality, respect for human life and dignity, protection of the vulnerable,
non-commercialization of reproduction, appropriate use of resources,
accountability, and balancing of individual and collective interests.1 5 In
an area as controversial as the new reproductive technologies, it is
particularly important to preface a detailed analysis of the possible
policy options with some basic normative reference points. Failure to do
so would entail the even greater risk of disappearing into a moral swamp
where an appreciation of reasoned alternative positions becomes

15 Royal Commission, ibid. at 52-53 and c. 3.
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impossible and where debates are reduced to voices shouting
incomprehensibly at each other across unfathomable moral voids.
B. Liberal Theories
1. Classical autonomy theories
For classical liberals, individuals are conceptualized as having
preceded the existence of civil society, but in a state of nature these
individuals are thought to have run the risk of mutually destructive
forms of anarchy. Hobbes, Locke, and later liberals postulated the
emergence of civil society as a form of social contract, where individuals
actually, tacitly, or hypothetically consented to surrender some measure
of individual, autonomy to the state in return for guarantees of the
protection of physical integrity and justly acquired forms of private
property, and the ability to enter into consensual relations with other
members of the society with respect to these property rights. Just as the
overarching social contract was conceived of as a form of "government
with the consent of the governed," whence it derived its legitimacy,
individual actual contracts were seen as a manifestation of government
with the consent of the governed. A central tenet of classical liberalism
has always been that the state should remain neutral amongst competing
conceptions of the good life, which individuals should be free to choose
for themselves in charting out their own lives and their relations with
others, and that the right and responsibility of individual moral choice
has overriding moral force in itself. In this conception of the limited
state, a strong distinction is drawn between public and private spheres,
and a central role is assigned to private property rights and private
ordering through freedom of contract. 16 In the reproductive exchange
context, this perspective implies that individuals on the supply and
demand sides should be assured of as many choices as possible with
regard to uses of the technologies and possible exchange relationships
from which to choose their own conception of the good life, and these
choices should be considered a private matter between parties to the
17
transaction-not a matter for state intervention.
16 See J.Gray, Liberalism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986).
17 See, for example, L.B. Andrews, "My Body, My Property" (October 1986) 16 Hastings
Center Rep. 28; and J. Robertson, "Minimize Government Regulation" in G.E. McCuen, ed., HiTech Babies:AlternativeReproductive Technologies (Hudson, Wisc.: Gary E. McCuen Publications,
1990) 127.
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A number of difficulties with classical autonomy theories that are
directly relevant to the new reproductive technologies context must be
noted briefly at this point. First, does the conception of private property
rights extend to an individual's own body or parts or aspects thereof?
Can individuals be said to "own" reproductive materials 18 such that they
should be free to buy or sell them like any other type of property? Most
autonomy theorists would answer in the affirmative. For Locke, private
property rights start with one's own body. These rights are then
projected into the external world through just acquisition of property
rights in external objects. However, even John Stuart Mill, a celebrated
proponent of classical liberal values, doubted whether people should be
permitted to sell themselves into slavery. According to Mill, a person is
not free to agree not to be free. 9 Nevertheless, most classical liberal
autonomy theorists would not consider participation in an exchange of
reproductive materials or services as analogous to selling oneself into
slavery.20
Second, there are serious difficulties with autonomy theories in
determining whether the initial acquisition of property rights was just,
and if not, what rectifications are required to redress initial unjust
acquisitions 1 In a contemporary setting, this translates into a concern
about the implications of gross inequalities in endowments that
individuals bring to their interactions with each other? 2 In a
reproductive exchange context, an example of this concern might be that
potential providers of gestational services are persons who are
disadvantaged in our society relative to "brokers" and demanders of
such services 23
18 For a discussion of three concepts of the embryo-the person, property, and "special
respect" views-see C. Perry & LK. Schneider, "Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their
Fate?" 13 J. Legal Med. 463 at 477-88.
19

On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) at 172-75.

20 R. Posner defends the practice of "surrogacy" against claims that it is analogous to slavery
in Sex and Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) at 413 and c. 15.
21 See, for example, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) at
174-82.
22
This issue will be discussed in more detail in section II(B)(3), "Distributive Justice," below.
23 Feminist Susan Sherwin argues that gestational service agreements in practice amount to
the exploitation of poor, under-educated, and emotionally unstable women: "Feminist Ethics and
New Reproductive Technologies" in C. Overall, ed., The Future of Human Reproduction (Toronto:
Women's Press, 1989) 259 at 266. See also, C. Overall, "Surrogate Motherhood" in M. Hanen & K.
Nielson, eds., Science, Morality & Feminist Theory-CanadianJournalof Philosophy Supp. 13
(Calgary. University of Calgary Press, 1987) 285 at 299. In the Baby M appeal, supranote 8 at 1249,
Wilentz CJ., speaking for the court, noted that "the Stems are not rich and the Whiteheads not
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Third, there is a problem of determining whether all preferences

have equal validity. Autonomy theories essentially take preferences as
given and do not inquire whether some preferences are more genuine or

more worthy than others. Indeed, where preferences come from, how
they are shaped and reshaped over time, and the legitimacy of the
sources that shape and reshape them are of little or no concern to

classical autonomy theorists. Thus, in the reproductive exchange
context, many autonomy theorists would argue that if a person manifests
a desire to enter into an exchange of reproductive materials or services,
no inquiry into the social or historical conditions which may have shaped
24
this preference is necessary.
Fourth, with respect to the central role played by freedom of
alienation or contract in these theories, autonomy theorists themselves
recognize that certain conditions must be met in order to regard a
decision to alienate property rights by contract or donation as
autonomous. The first condition is that the decision be voluntary, i.e.,
uncoerced. A very large body of complex and controversial
philosophical literature has developed around the issue of coercion 5
Despite these ambiguities, in practice autonomy theorists tend to adopt
a rather stringent definition of coercion. In the reproductive exchange
context, many autonomy theorists would not consider an agreement to,
for example, undergo an abortion in order to sell the fetal tissue
"coerced" unless the woman involved was physically forced to agree to
26
the exchange. Paucity of alternative choices for income enhancement
poor. Nevertheless, it is clear to us that it is unlikely that surrogate mothers will be as
proportionately numerous among those women in the top twenty percent income bracket as among
those in the bottom twenty percent."
24
Deborah Poff argues, in the different but related context of in vitro fertilization, that "[t]he
fact that their choice may be conditioned by a created want does not prima facie make it an
unacceptable choice": "Reproductive Technology and Social Policy in Canada" in Overall, ibid., 216
at 223. Others argue that even if the desire to reproduce is fostered by "unhealthy" societal and
historical influences, the state should not be permitted to prohibit choices in this area by fertile or
infertile individuals. See, for example, J.A. Robertson, "Procreative Liberty, Embryos, and
Collaborative Reproduction: A Legal Perspective" (1988) 13 Wom. & Health 179 at 190, 192; M.
Balboni, "The Right of Procreative Choice" in McCuen, supra note 17 at 106; and L.B. Andrews,
"Policy and Procreation: The Case of Surrogate Motherhood" (Feminism and Law Workshop
Series, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law) (27 March 1992) at 12-14.
25 See A. Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1987) and M.
Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993)
c. 4.
26
Autonomists argue that a choice need not be seen as morally unacceptable simply because
it is constrained. In the context of gestational service exchanges, see P. Schuck, "Some Reflections
on the Baby M Case" (1988) 76 Geo. LJ.1793; R. Arneson, "Commodification and Commercial
Surrogacy" (1992) 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 132 at 158; and A. Wertheimer, "Two Questions About
Surrogacy and Exploitation" (1992) 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 211 at 224-27.
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such as the financial constraints faced by a low-income single mother
who possesses few marketable skills other than her ability to provide ova,
gestational services, or fetal tissue, or moral pressures, such as pressure
on a pregnant woman from a family member in need of fetal tissue for
therapeutic purposes, would be unlikely to constitute "coercion"
27
sufficient to invalidate the agreement.
A second condition for an autonomous choice to enter into
contracts or other relationships with other parties is that the decision be
adequately informed. Again, however, while some cases are easy, many
others are highly problematic. Very few individuals enter into contracts
with perfect information about the current or future state of affairs as
these may bear on the value of the contract or interaction to the
contracting parties. One can, of course, argue that the decision to
forego the opportunity of acquiring further information is itself an
autonomous decision, but if the condition of informed consent is to
retain any salience, there will be a wide range of other cases where an
individual choice may reasonably be regarded as defective (nonautonomous), because it was made in the presence of misinformation or
in the absence of highly material information 28 Autonomy theorists
may accept that persons entering into agreements for the exchange of
reproductive materials and services should be provided with all relevant
information about physical (and possibly also psychological) risks. It is
unclear whether information failure resulting from circumstances which
are, by their very nature, unforeseeable (such as the bonding process
experienced by some suppliers of gestational services as the pregnancy
progresses) would be sufficient to invalidate the exchange on this
ground 9 The inability of young gamete suppliers in straitened financial
27

For a discussion of a variety of arguments in favour of according women the right to provide
fetal tissue, see A. Fine, "The Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplants" (1988) 18 Hastings Center Rep. 5
at 7; and J.A. Robertson, "Fetal Tissue Transplants" (1988) 66 Wash. U. L.Q. 443 at 463-72. For a
discussion of some of the potential sources and types of coercion to which a woman could be
subjected, see Burlingame, supra note 3; B. Lafave, "Who's In Control? Eggs Embryos and Fetal
Tissue" (Fall 1988) Healthsharing 29 at 31; and Danis, supra note 3.
28
See Trebilcock, supra note 25 at c. 5.
29 See, for example, Posner, supra note 20 at 423-24, 426-27, and c. 15. Posner argues that
gestational services agreements, which he terms "contracts of surrogate motherhood" and "the sale
of parental rights," should be specifically enforceable despite various concerns with regard to the
unpredictability of the mother-child bond. Posner argues that to require the "surrogate" mother to
participate in counselling, or to question her ability to enter into a contract of this type, is
"patronizing." See also R.A. Posner, "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of
Surrogate Motherhood" (1989) 5 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 21. Conversely, Michael
Trebilcock and Rosemin Keshvani, among others, argue from a liberal perspective that special
provision must be made, in the form of a legislated "opt-out" right for the birth mother, in
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circumstances to foresee how the realization of their possible genetic
paternity or maternity will affect them in later life30 would also be an
ambiguous (and even less likely) ground for the invalidation of this type
of exchange. It could be argued that provision of information about
such risks ex ante (that is, before the commencement of the exchange) is
sufficient to enable potential suppliers to determine whether they are
willing to accept the possibility of this risk materializing expost3 l (after
the exchange has been consummated).
A third condition that must be met in order for contractual
arrangements to promote autonomy values pertains to third-party
effects: even if the immediate parties to contractual arrangements are
acting voluntarily and with full information, the transaction may have a
negative impact on one or more third parties, thus violating their
autonomy. This is often referred to as the "harm" principle, which was
first enunciated in these terms by John Stuart Mill. 32 Mill appears to
have assumed that determining whether actions by A alone, or by A and
B in association with each other, harm third parties was a matter of
relatively mechanistic determination. However, again, an extremely
complex body of philosophical literature has developed around the harm
principle, which is now widely understood to be an unavoidably moral

recognition of the unpredictability of the mother-child bond: "The Role of Private Ordering in
Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective" (1991) 41 U.T.LJ. 533 at 584-85. For studies on
the empirical question of "bonding" between mother and baby, see L Millen & S. Roll, "Solomon's
Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological Bereavement" (1985) 55 Am. J.Orthopsych. 411 at 412, in
which it was found that birth mothers who give a child up for adoption experience anguish as much
as twenty years later. In V.C. Jackson, "Baby M and the Question of Surrogate Parenthood" (1988)
76 Geo. I.J.
1811 at note 19, the author cites numerous studies establishing that many birth mothers
severely underestimate the emotional trauma resulting from giving up the child. See also, E. Kane,
Birth Mother: The Story of America's First Legal Surrogate Mother (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1988); and M.M. Suh, "Surrogate Motherhood: An Argument for Denial of Specific
Performance" (1989) 22 Colum. J.L & Soc. Probs. 357 at 362-72. At 379, Suh writes that "[b]ecause
of the nature of the bonding process ...
a birth mother cannot make a 'knowig' or 'informed' waiver
of her parental ties prior to birth." Some argue that consensus on the question of mother-child
bonding has by no means been established: D. MacPhee & K. Forest, "Surrogacy: Programme
Comparison and Policy Implications" (1990) 4 Int'l. j.L & Faro. 308 at 315.
30
This possibility is suggested in J.Glover et aL, Ethicsof New Reproductive Technologies: The
Glover Report to the European Commission (DeKalb, Ill.:
Northern Illinois University Press, 1989) at
32-38 [hereinafter Glover Report].
31 Posner, supra note 20 at 426, argues that "contracts always are made before rather than
after they are performed;" parties must accept the risk that the situation ex post will not be as
favourable as was anticipated ex ante. Schuck, supra note 26 at 1799, also argues that "[t]he risk of
subsequent regret is the price we pay for our commitment to personal autonomy and responsibility
in the face of uncertainty."
32
Supra note 19 at 68-69.
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question. 33 That is to say, one could give the harm principle so
expansive an interpretation that the private ordering regime would
largely come to an end, simply because somebody out there in society
happens to take offence at the activities of A alone or A in association
with B. On the other hand, to define harm to third parties as entailing
only direct forms of physical infliction of injury is to adopt an arbitrary
and unprincipled definition of harm that assigns special significance to
physical impacts on bodily integrity or private property, without
explaining why these impacts should be viewed as more serious than any
of a number of less tangible impacts.
Yet despite these ambiguities, autonomy theorists are unlikely to
consider exchanges of reproductive materials and services invalid solely
on the grounds that they cause intangible harm to what were described
above as "moral interests." Harm to the fetus in the case of fetal tissue
exchange, or harm to the gamete or zygote in these types of exchanges,
would not be considered sufficient to invalidate the agreement, because
to recognize fetuses, gametes, or zygotes as "persons" could bring about
a situation in which the interests of suppliers and demanders might be in
conflict with the "interests" of the reproductive material3 4 Autonomy
theorists would be reluctant to assign "interests" to gametes, zygotes,
and fetuses, when these interests could constrain the autonomy of
existing persons and bring into question the concept that reproductive
materials are the property of the person whose body produces them.
These theorists would argue that persons who are offended by the
thought of harm to fetuses, or the thought that exchanges of gametes,
zygotes, or gestational services are taking place, are free not to take part

33

See Trebilcock, supranote 25 at c. 3.

34 See J.A. Robertson, "Procreative Liberty, Embryos, and Collaborative Reproduction: A
Legal Perspective" in E.H. Baruch, A.F. D'Adamo, Jr. & J. Seager, eds., Embryos, Ethics and
Women's Rights: Exploringthe New Reproductive Technologies (New York: Haworth, 1988) 179 at
182-83. In the fetal tissue context, an argument is made that "the fetus lacks the status of a child
and, after death, has no protectable interests of its own": GJ. Annas & S. Elias, "The Politics of
Transplantation of Human Fetal Tissue" (1989) 320 New Eng. J. Med. 1079 at 1080 and passim.
Conversely, most autonomy theorists do not argue that the child in a gestational service agreement
has no interest in the exchange: see, for example, Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 29 at 582-83.
Some argue that the child's interests (autonomy) are advanced by the mere fact of its having been
born at all: Robertson, supra note 24 at 186. The argument is also made that since these children
are so clearly desired at birth, they might end up feeling especially loved and wanted: L Gostin, "A
Civil Iaberties Analysis of Surrogacy Arrangements" (1988) 16 Law, Med. & Health Care 7 at 9.
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in such exchanges, but should not be permitted to forbid the

participation of others who do not share these views.3 5
It will be obvious to readers that autonomy theories and their
limitations are likely to be central to debates over commercialization of
the new reproductive technologies. On the one hand, it can be argued
that consensual transactions for the sale and purchase of reproductive
material reflect individual autonomous choices and are a private matter,
implicating the parties to the agreement and not any state or public
interest. On the other hand, it can reasonably be argued that many of
the general difficulties presented by autonomy theories are acutely
salient in the present context. A broader interpretation of coercion,
information failure, and harm to third parties would arguably permit
Mill's slavery concern to be extrapolated to the sale of reproductive
materials and services.
Despite the complexities of arguments for and against autonomy
values in the reproductive context, some contemporary analysts strongly
subscribe to assigning a central role to such values in this context. For
example, John Robertson argues that the state has no right to constrain
private arrangements between individuals with respect to the exchange
of genetic material, or even the use of medical procedures to screen
36
reproductive material for gender, genetic, or other characteristics
Some liberal feminists take a similar view. 3 7 Indeed, more broadly,
feminist movements have invoked autonomy values to strongly attack
state restrictions on contraception and to advance the claim for

35
John Robertson writes, "[u]nless sale is connected with tangible harm to other persons, the
moral or symbolic offense that some people might find in such transactions is not a sound basis for
restricting procreative liberty by banning sale of embryos": ibid. at 188. See also MA- Warren, "Is
rvF Research a Threat to Women's Autonomy?" in P. Singer et aL, eds., Embryo Experimentation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 125. Warren writes, at 135, that

[c]omplete reproductive freedom is a utopian ideal; but partial reproductive freedom is
better than none. The long-term value to women of rvF and other new reproductive
technologies remains to be seen. For that very reason, it is vital that individual women's
decisions about the use of rvF be respected. Neither physicians nor legislators have the
wisdom to override women's own informed judgements about matters so central to their
reproductive lives.
36
"Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth" (1983) 69
Va. L. Rev. 405; "Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structures of the New
Reproduction" (1986) 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 942; supra note 24 at 186. See also J. Heller, "Should
Genetic Engineering be Permitted?" in Law and Economics Working Paper Series, vol. 24
(Toronto: Canadian Law and Economics Association, 1994) at 43-44.
37
See, for example, LB. Andrews, "Alternative Modes of Reproduction," in Cohen & Taub,
supra note 8 at 361; and "Control and Compensation: Laws Governing Extracorporeal Generative
Materials" (1989) 14 . Med. & Phil. 540 at 549-51.
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unconstrained access to abortion, where epithets like "pro-choice" or
"hands off my body" have evoked classical liberal values. In the
reproductive exchange context, liberal feminists argue that to be
consistent with positions that they have taken on the centrality of the
right of individual choice in contexts such as contraception and abortion,
they should similarly defend the right of individuals, including women, to
make whatever private decisions they find appropriate with respect to
their bodies and to the use of these technologies. 38 If individual choice
is to be respected in the case of abortion, where another life or potential
life is being terminated, then individual choice should be at least as
strongly respected with regard to participation in new reproductive
technologies, where another life is being created. In addition, the
argument is sometimes made that these technologies, particularly in
their application to sperm and zygote exchanges, provide the potential
for liberating women from subordination by men by permitting the
possibility of childbirth and childrearing by, for example, single or
lesbian women, without requiring relationships with men.3 9 Moreover, it
is argued that to prohibit women from demanding payment for
reproductive services or materials is to sanctify traditional and
oppressive notions of women as limited to roles as altruistic childrearers
and caregivers, which is considered by some to be tantamount to
"moralized slavery." 40
2. Utilitarian-efficiency theories
Unlike the limited role assigned to the state in most autonomy
theories, utilitarian theories contemplate a larger role for the state in
constraining, shaping, or directing the activities of individual members, if
only to solve coordination or collective action problems that individual
actors may confront. Unlike deontological theories of autonomy,
38 See C. Shalev, Birth Power. The Casefor Surrogacy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1989); and LB. Andrews, "Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists" (1988) 16
Law, Med. & Health L 72 at 73-78.
39

See W. Kymlicka, "Rethinking the Family" (1991) 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 77; and R. Rowland,
"Motherhood, Patriarchal Power, Alienation and the Issue of 'Choice' in Sex Preselection," in G.
Corea et al., eds., Man-Made Women: How New Reproductive Technologies Affect Women
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) 74 at 84-86.
40 Shalev, supra note 38 at 164. For a Marxist argument to similar effect, see J. Ollenburger
& J. Hamlin, "'All Birthing Should be Paid Labor'-A Marxist Analysis of the Commodification of
Motherhood" in H. Richardson, ed., On the Problem of SurrogateParenthood-Analzing the Baby M
Case (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1987).
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utilitarian theories are end-state or consequentialist in nature.
According to early utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham, the state is
justified in adopting collective policies that increase the total or at least
average utility of members of the society in question. Here, utility is
conceived of in subjective terms-pleasures or pains felt by individuals.
The state is entitled to engage in a maximizing calculus with regard to
policy choices if such policies would result in a net increase in average
utility in society-even though the distribution of utility associated with
these policies may be quite uneven, and for some individuals, negative.
In other words, in contrast to autonomy theories, the state is entitled to
sacrifice the welfare of some if this would more than proportionately
increase the welfare of others. 41 Thus, if it could be determined that the
commercialization of reproductive materials and services had more
adverse than positive effects, measured by an aggregate of individuals'
utility functions, then the state would be justified in curtailing these
activities, despite the preferences of those individuals who wished to
make use of them. 42
As with autonomy theories, a number of standard difficulties
present themselves. Some of these difficulties are conceptual, whereas
others are methodological or operational. At a conceptual level, the
principal objection to utilitarianism is that, while it counts every
individual's utilities and treats them as equally valid, it permits some
individuals to be used as a means to the ends of others and hence
violates the conception of equal moral agency that underlies classical
liberal theories. For example, a sexist, racist, or homophobic society
might be able to justify policies that impose these values on particular
minorities if these policies could plausibly be regarded as increasing
average utility. Conversely, however, to the extent that a minority of
members of society were sexist, racist, or homophobic in their private
interactions, and the majority of members of society were opposed to
these values, a utilitarian calculus might well justify the imposition of
legal constraints on the minority that espouses these values.
At a methodological or operational level, utilitarianism, in many
contexts, presents almost insuperable problems of indeterminacy. For
example, in the reproductive technology context, all the utilities and

41 See W. Kymlicka, ContemporaryPoliticalPhilosophy:An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990) c. 2.
42 A brief example of the factors involved in a utilitarian calculus in the reproductivetechnologies context is provided in the GloverReport,supra note 30 at 27-29, and in M. WarnockA
Question of Life: The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisationand Embryology (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1985) at ix-xvi.

632

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 32 NO. 4

disutilities of every member of society who is directly or indirectly
affected by these activities would have to be weighed. Affected parties
would include infertile couples and their families on the demand side,
providers of reproductive material and their families on the supply side,
the children created by these exchanges, medical and research interests,
and third parties generally who may have widely divergent views as to
the appropriateness of these activities. 43 How all of these utility effects
can, in practice, be uncovered, measured, and compared is far from
obvious; the only possibility would seem to be a retreat to a kind of
majoritarianism whereby these issues would simply be resolved by
popular citizen vote or a free majority vote of representatives in the
relevant legislature. 44 However, the likelihood of such a vote accurately
revealing underlying utility functions and intensity of preferences seems
remote. Indeed, much of the indeterminacy in debates over the new
reproductive technologies would seem to derive from the fact that any
number of more or less plausible scenarios as to the possible impact of
these technologies on a wide range of groups in society can be advanced,
with little or no prospect of empirical validation of the claimed impacts.
At this juncture it is important to note two economic derivatives
of utilitarian theories, both of which involve a particular conception of
efficiency. 45 The narrower and more stringent derivative is Pareto
43
Ruth Macklin, in "Ethics and Human Values in Family Planning: Perspectives of Different
Cultural and Religious Settings" in Z. Bankowski, J. Barzelatto & A. Capron, eds., Ethics and
Human Values in Family Planning (Geneva: Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences (aoms), 1989) 68 at 71, provides an indication of what this calculation might involve in the
context of gestational services arrangements:
A number of factors must be taken into account: the benefits to infertile couples, and the
happiness resulting from having a child that they could not otherwise have; the
unhappiness of surrogate mothers who regret having made such an arrangement and seek
to get their babies back (a minority of those who have served as surrogates); the feeling of
satisfaction in helping others, on the part of the women who serve as surrogate mothers
and have no regrets; the unknown effects on a surrogate mother's other children-the
children of her marriage, who are half-siblings of the child concerned; the uncertain
consequences for the children born of surrogacy arrangements-whether they will find it
an emotional burden; and other consequences, positive and negative, for the families
involved in such arrangements and for others. How can these multiple and varied effects
be determined? And even if the relevant empirical facts can be ascertained, how should
the good and bad consequences be balanced?
44
The Glover Report recognizes that the interests included in a utilitarian calculation and the
amount of credence given to the claims of each seem inevitably to fall prey to a host of unavoidably
subjective judgments by the decision maker purporting to perform the analysis: supra, note 30 at 2527.

45 These concepts are developed more fully in MJ. Trebilcock, "Economic Analysis of Law,"
in R. Devlin, ed., CanadianPerspectiveson Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 103.

1994]

Commercializationof Reproductive Materials

efficiency. This entails asking of any particular transaction or policy
option whether it is likely to make somebody better off and nobody
worse off, using the parties' current state of affairs as the baseline. The
ethical intuition behind this concept is that no reasonable person could
object to a transaction or policy that meets this test, except for unworthy
reasons such as envy. The conventional economic argument is that one
would not expect to observe two parties entering into a private exchange
unless they both believed themselves likely to be made better off by it.
As these transactions generalize across the economy, and as markets
develop, the price mechanism serves two allocative functions: on the
demand side, resources are allocated to their highest-valued uses (as
reflected in willingness to pay); and on the supply side, resources are
drawn into activities where prices that demanders are willing to pay
exceed the cost of meeting these demands. On this view, social welfare
in general is enhanced by providing a broad domain for private ordering.
Most neoclassical economists' commitment to the private ordering
process is largely due to their attraction to the Pareto principle. It will
be obvious that most collective decisions by government cannot meet the
Pareto test: that is, they almost invariably make some members of the
community better off while making others worse off.
However, just as autonomy theories presented some difficulties,
here too certain conditions must be met in order for this inference of
joint welfare enhancement to be justified. Obviously, an exchange
coerced at gunpoint-for example, the mugger's proposition "your
money (or, in the reproductive exchange context, your gametes) or your
life"-is not a transaction that meets the Pareto principle, because the
mugger is made better off by the transaction but the passer-by is made
worse off. Beyond cases of physical force such as this, it is far from clear
what degree of voluntariness is required in order for the Pareto criterion
to be met 4 6 Similarly, decisions made with imperfect information may
lead an individual to regret a transaction and to feel that she or he has
been made worse off by it. An example might be that of a woman who is
not told that the tissue from her abortus is to be used for transplant
therapy rather than research, and later regrets the transaction because
she is uncomfortable with the thought that the material was used for this
purpose.47 In what circumstances does the absence of complete
information warrant rebutting the inference of joint welfare
enhancement?
46

Trebilcock, supranote 25 at c. 4.

47 See J.F. Childress, "Ethics, Public Policy, and Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation
Research" (June 1991) Kennedy Inst. Eth. J. 93.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 32 NO. 4

Additionally, while it may be obvious that most collective
decisions cannot meet the Pareto principle, it is in fact arguable that
most private transactions also cannot meet it once third party effects are
taken into account. If even one member of society is offended or
otherwise aggrieved by a transaction entered into between A and B, such
that her or his utility is diminished, even though the transaction between
A and B is fully voluntary and informed, it is arguable that the
transaction does not meet the Pareto principle. 48 In the reproductive
exchange context, the number of third parties in the moral interests
category who may be offended by transactions involving reproductive
material or services is such that no exchange of this type could be
Pareto-superior.
Finally, the Pareto principle is insensitive to the justice or
injustice of the distribution of prior endowments that parties bring to an
exchange, and simply takes the existing distribution as a given. Thus,
transactions entered into by disadvantaged women, with nothing else to
sell but their reproductive services or material, may well meet the Pareto
criterion in that such exchanges may improve their welfare over the
status quo ante. On a related point, one might also note that the Pareto
.principle is not concerned with the division or equality of gains from
exchange, however disproportionate the gains to each party, as long as
each party gains something. For example, an exchange between a couple
that is paid nominally more than their costs in producing a zygote, which
is then used to produce a child, could meet the Pareto test despite the
fact that the demander may have gained much more from the exchange
than did the suppliers.
Despite these difficulties, a Pareto-efficiency perspective does
draw our attention to the fact that certain exchanges fall further short of
the Pareto principle than do others: exchanges involving the de novo
production of gametes, zygotes, or fetal material are more likely to
render the supplier "worse off' as a result of the exchange (in that the
supplier has incurred physical and psychological risks that she would not
otherwise have assumed), whereas exchanges involving "spare" gametes,
zygotes, or fetal material are less likely to render the supplier "worse
off" because the material would have been produced, and disposed of,
whether or not the possibility for exchange existed. Also, a utilitarian
perspective more generally draws our attention to the fact that different
types of exchanges are likely to implicate different kinds and numbers of
third parties: exchange of fetal material from spontaneous abortions
48 See G. Calabresi, "The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further" (1991) 100 Yale
IU.1211.
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(miscarriages) would offend fewer moral interests than would the
exchange of material from elective abortions; 49 exchange of gametes
would offend fewer interests than would the exchange of zygotes (which
are viewed by some as the moral equivalent of living children, 50 and
which raise issues that are much more difficult to resolve between
parties in the event of, for example, divorce or disagreement as to
disposition).
Situations frequently arise in which the state must make
decisions on behalf of the collective even though the Pareto principle
cannot be satisfied. Economists have, accordingly, been compelled to
recognize a somewhat more complex concept of efficiency, which is
often referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. With this form of
efficiency, the question to be posed with regard to a collective decision
or legal rule is, "do the gainers gain sufficiently from it such that they
could hypothetically fully compensate the losers, so as to render the latter
indifferent to the decision or rule, while still preserving some gains for
themselves?" This concept of efficiency is also referred to as "potential
Pareto efficiency," which reflects the fact that both sets of parties are not
in fact made better off because the losers do not in fact have to be
compensated. In effect, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency entails a cost-benefit
analysis, but unlike utilitarianism it only recognizes preferences that are
supported by willingness to pay, which is in part a function of ability to
pay. The wealth maximization value embedded in Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency has been defended by theorists such as Richard Posner on the
grounds that individuals who can support their preferences with dollars
are, in most cases, only able to do so because they have provided goods
and services that are valued by other members of the community, while
49 However, it must be noted that it is very difficult to procure tissue from miscarriages, or
from therapeutic (as opposed to elective) abortions, because in many of these cases the likelihood
of anomaly or defect may render the material unsuitable for transplantation. In addition, since
miscarriages generally occur outside of a clinical setting, tissue retrieval is difficult, if not impossible.
See M.B. Mahowald, "Neural Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Should We Do What We Can Do?"
(1989) 7 Neurologic Clinics 745 at 750-51; and B.M. Dickens, "Fetal Tissue Transplantation" (6 July
1989) Transp. Imp. Tod. 33.
50 See, for example, the official position of the Catholic church, as expressed by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin
and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day" in R.T. Hull, ed.,
Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990) 21. The
Congregation writes, at 22, that "the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its
existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect
that is morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality." While the Catholic
church does not view gametes as the moral equivalent of living children, it must be noted that the
church opposes the use of donor gametes, among other applications of the new reproductive
technologies.
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individuals who cannot support their preferences with dollars have
presumably been less valuable members of the community 5 ' This
attempt at an ethical justification of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has been
widely criticized and discredited, largely because willingness and ability
to pay often do not reflect any defensible concept of desert, but rather
reflect the luck of the genetic lottery or of early family circumstance, and
provide no basis for disregarding preferences unsupported by wealth.52
A more pragmatic justification for the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
principle is that it is more operational than the utilitarian principle,
because costs and benefits associated with any proposed policy choice
are more easily measured and compared in dollar metrics than in
abstract "units" of utility. This justification is also highly contestable.
In many policy settings, it will be impossible to secure an accurate
revelation of preferences in terms of what people are prepared to pay to
see a particular policy option adopted or rejected. Even if accurate
preference revelation could be obtained, which is inherently difficult in
the absence of voluntary transactions reflecting actual resource
allocation decisions, comparing gains and losses entails making highly
controversial assumptions about commensurability of utility functions.
For example, does a one dollar gain to a wealthy person count the same
as a one dollar loss to a poor person? And in the reproductive exchange
context, how are we to place a price on materials or services which result
in the creation of a child who is "priceless"? 53
51 RA Posner, The Economicsof Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981)
at c.4.
52 See the symposia Efficiency as a Legal Concern in (1980) 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 and Change
inthe Common Law: Legal andEconomic Perspectives in (1980) 9J.Legal Stud.
53 Peter Schuck has suggested that the sum that adoptive parents are prepared to pay to
secure a newborn through private or independent adoption agencies might provide a starting figure
for estimating the value of gestational services. However, Schuck notes that commissioning
individuals might be prepared to pay more than this to obtain a child who is, at least in part,
genetically related to themselves: "The Social Utility of Surrogacy" (1990) 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 132. But Eric Mack, in "Dominos and the Fear of Commodification" in J.W. Chapman & J.R.
Pennock, eds., Markets andJustice (New York. New York University Press, 1989) 198, has argued, at
217, that despite any "price" the market may assign, a core of internally valued activities remains
which persistently escapes the market's pricing mechanisms:
[tjypically, one can know the price of something yet not identify the value of that
something with its monetary price because the two somethings are not identical.... What
is paid for when one "buys" a child is the opportunity to become a parent to that child
(the child it will become through one's parentage of it); one does not buy that developing
child and one's relation to it. The costs incurred for such an opportunity can hardly be
identified with the value (even the discounted value!) one enjoys in the child.
In more conventional economic terms, commissioning parents are likely to realize a substantial
"consumer surplus" beyond the fees paid.
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Despite these formidable difficulties with both utilitarianism in
general and the two efficiency derivatives of it, it must be acknowledged
that many decisions that individuals, families, and communities must
make often necessarily reflect a crude or intuitive utilitarian calculus.
Moreover, the framework has several helpful aspects, such as drawing
attention to the full array of options that may be deployed to address a
particular resource allocation decision, for example, how to address the
problem of infertility in terms of relative emphasis on prevention, cure,
or other reproductive options; identifying the opportunity costs
associated with each option; and permitting some intuitive comparison
between the net costs or benefits associated with particular options and
those associated with other options, for example, in determining an
appropriate allocation of reproductive materials to various proposed
research projects.
3. Distributive justice theories
Classical autonomy theories entail a negative concept of liberty
that rejects the legitimacy of external constraints on individual action
and would perceive forms of wealth redistribution as "coerced," at least
if one were able to assume that the initial acquisition of property rights
was just. At most, these theorists would advocate a once-and-for-all
rectification of past injustices in acquisition. While utilitarian theories
contemplate state action in a wider range of circumstances, the objective
of maximizing total or average utility has no direct, concrete implications
for how utility should be distributed. However, another strand of liberal
theory-sometimes referred to as "revisionist liberalism" 54-focusses on
justice in the distribution of resources and opportunities. This entails a
positive theory of liberty. According to Hegel and his followers,
individual freedom in the full sense involves having an opportunity for
self-realization. If certain resources, powers, or abilities are needed for
self-realization to be effectively achievable, then having these resources
must be considered part of freedom itself. As Dyzenhaus explains, all
individuals should have the circumstances that make it possible to lead
autonomous lives. This preference will require that liberals attempt to
eradicate social practices that impose preferences on others, such as the
preference for the patriarchal life.s5 This view is much less concerned
than classical autonomy theories with necessarily elusive normative and
54

See Gray,supra note 16.

55 D. Dyzenhaus, "Liberalism, Autonomy and Neutrality" (1992) 42 U.T.LJ. 354 at 375.
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historical questions as to the justice of initial acquisitions, but rather
starts with the status quo.5 6 In common with utilitarianism, and in
contrast to classical autonomy theories, it shares an end-state or
consequentialist orientation.
A basic difficulty with theories of positive liberty is that it is not
clear what self-realization entails for different individuals, and therefore
what resources are required. Moreover, advocates of positive liberty,
even if satisfied with the justice of the initial acquisition of property
rights, often invoke an expansive conception of positive liberty to justify
continual state involvement in the distribution of resources in order to
maintain a just distribution over time, arguably entailing state
interference in (wealthier) individuals' ability to pursue their own life
57
plans as they please.
The most ambitious and best known contemporary articulation
of a theory of distributive justice that attempts to address some of these
problems is that provided by John Rawls 8 Rawls's theory builds on the
earlier social contract liberal tradition by constructing a social contract
behind a "veil of ignorance," which prevents individuals from knowing
their place in society and their natural endowments. Of particular
salience to the reproductive exchange context, individuals would not
know whether they were wealthier demanders or poorer suppliers, men
or women, or possessors of particularly desirable attributes. Rawls
argues that individuals in this state (the "original position") would agree
to the following principles of justice:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b)
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity. Inequalities of opportunity are only
acceptable if they enhance the welfare of the least advantaged.
This approach has advantages over utilitarianism in that it
confers on individuals in the original position a veto against policies
which would maximize general welfare while invading the liberty and
damaging the interests of some. While the "maximin" or "difference"
principle gives priority to the poorest in society by condemning as unjust
56
57

Gray, supranote 16 at 57-58.
Nozick, supra note 21; and L Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in 1. Berlin, ed., Four

Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
58

A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
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any inequalities that do not benefit them, the greatest equal liberty
principle prohibits the unjust distributions of unfreedom that
utilitarianism would permit. Rawls contemplates that his principles of
justice would be effectuated through basic background institutions in
society, such as the tax and transfer system, while minimizing
encroachments on the autonomy of individuals to pursue on their own,
or through association with others, their own particular conceptions of
the good life.
In the reproductive exchange context, distributive justice issues
arise on both the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, in an
unconstrained market, access to these technologies will, to a significant
extent, be a function of wealth. To the extent that one believes that the
general distribution of wealth in our current society comports with a
defensible concept of distributive justice, one might not object to
resources being rationed on the basis of willingness to pay. However, we
have little reason to be confident that this proposition holds generally
true. Distributive justice theorists would argue that activities that have a
disproportionate negative impact on the disadvantaged are unjust.
Accordingly, a system of unconstrained commodification which
benefitted wealthier demanders while excluding many less wealthy
demanders from participation in the activity, or discriminated against
historically disadvantaged groups, such as lesbian or single women, or
imposed a greater proportion of the "costs" of an activity on the poor,
would not be considered distributively just.5 9 A system that allowed
demanders to pay for materials or services on a sliding scale, with poorer
demanders more heavily subsidized by the state, and which forbade
discrimination on grounds unrelated to parenting ability (such as sexual

59 This is also a concern for feminists writing from a distributive justice perspective. See, for

example, H. Bryant, The Infertility Dilemma: Reproductive Technologies and Prevention (Ottawa:
Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1990); Macklin, supra note 43; and G. Corea,
The Mother Machine (New York: Harper & Row, 1985). A related concern is that research
interests, which are also wealthy and powerful relative to the least advantaged individuals in society,

will make discoveries and advance scientific knowledge to the advantage of everyone but at a
disproportionate expense to poorer people, in that the poor (who may be disproportionately
attracted by the financial rewards offered) will bear the physical and psychological risks involved in

providing materials for research. This concern is in keeping with a key bioethical principle adopted
in the Belmont Report, that research subjects not be drawn disproportionately from disadvantaged
groups in the population, and that the resultant discoveries not be of de facto benefit to only the
more advantaged groups in society. The principle in question is the "justice" principle, discussed in
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, The Belmont Report EthicalPrinciplesand Guidelinesfor the Protectionof Human Subjects
of Research (Washington: 1978) at 9-10.
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orientation and marital status), would be considered a more morally
attractive alternative. 6°
A distributive justice perspective also draws our attention to the
fact that in Canada, as in many other countries, the provision of health
care has been generally viewed as a basic good that should be available
independently of the resources of those who require care. If one views
infertility as an illness or physical disability similar to many other
disabilities, the treatment of which should be covered by public health
care, then it would follow that medical technologies which seek to
address the consequences of infertility should be rationed on some basis
other than willingness to pay, such as some definition of need, or merit
on medical grounds (i.e., amenability to treatment), or queuing, or some
combination of these.61 The provision of fetal tissue for therapeutic
purposes would also require similar treatment, because fetal tissue is a
potentially life-, health-, and dignity-saving resource 62 analogous to
organs or bone marrow which are currently rationed according to
criteria such as the above.
On the supply side, classical autonomy theories would be largely
insensitive to economic pressures that might drive individuals to supply
reproductive materials or services and, indeed, would view this option as
one that increases what may admittedly be a very meagre opportunity
set. Utilitarianism might also regard the opportunity to increase one's
welfare in this way as contributing to average social utility. However,
distributive justice theorists are likely to view pressing economic
circumstances as symptomatic of inequalities in the distribution of
background endowments, although their response would ideally be to
rectify these inequalities through society's basic institutions, without
necessarily constraining the opportunities of individuals to enter into

60 Several writers make the argument that if gestational-service arrangements and the use of
reproductive materials and technologies are to be permitted, there is a role for the state in
allocating these services regardless of whether there is a free market on the supply side. Susan
Sherwin makes this argument regarding reproductive technologies in general, in "Feminist Ethics
and New Reproductive Technologies," supra note 23 at 259. D. Poff, supra note 24,passim,makes
the same argument in the context of donor insemination and in vitro fertilization.
61 For a useful discussion of this issue and other matters of concern to distributive justice
theorists in the context of the new reproductive technologies, see R. Dresser, "Social Justice in New
Reproductive Techniques" in A. Milunsky & GJ. Annas, eds., NationalSymposium on Geneticsand
the Law III (New York: Plenum Press, 1985) 159. See also, Royal Commission, supra note 1 at c. 4.
62 For a discussion of the important issues that are at stake for the fetal tissue transplant
recipient, see G.L. Morgan, "Is There a Right to Fetal Tissue Transplantation" (1991) 10 U.
Tasmania L Rev. 129.
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these arrangements if they so wish. To impose such constraints may
offend Rawls's first principle.
Nevertheless, in a society where these inequalities have not been
remedied, to permit a system of unconstrained commodification-which
would involve financial inducements for suppliers that would
disproportionately induce the poor to participate-may offend Rawls's
second principle.63 The subject of financial inducements will be
discussed in more detail in Sections III and IV below, but at this
juncture it is necessary to note the potential for suppliers to be drawn
disproportionately from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged,
who are able to provide reproductive materials and services at a lower
opportunity cost than wealthier persons. 64 This is analogous to the
concern discussed by Calabresi and Bobbit in Tragic Choices65 over the
likelihood that, in an American context, voluntary recruitment of a
regular army to serve in a limited (foreign) war may entail overrepresentation of, and disproportionate sacrifices by, low-income blacks.
In the gestational services context, the concern is that economically
disadvantaged women, women of colour, and Third-World women could
be disproportionately induced to provide gestational services, governed
by embryo gestation and transfer agreements (in which the
commissioning individual[s] provide the zygote), because their
opportunity costs may be significantly lower than those of other
women. 66
An additional issue of concern to distributive justice theorists is
that of "differential pricing." This term refers to the likelihood that an
unconstrained market would result in the offering of higher prices to
suppliers of materials and services with highly-demanded characteristics:
gametes, zygotes, and gestational services involving the use of the
supplier's own ova by way of pre-conception agreements, offered, for
example, by white, blonde, blue-eyed suppliers, could well be purchased
at a higher price than material from persons with less-demanded

63 An opposing argument, made by Richard Posner, among others, is that unconstrained
commodification has afavourable impact on the poor because it increases their already meagre
opportunity set. This argument will be discussed below, in Section III.
64 See Maholwald, supra note 49 at 755; and Royal Commission, supranote 1 at 670-74.
65

G. Calabresi & P. Bobbit, Tragic Choices (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978).

66 See, for example, Corea, supra note 59, especially c. 11: "Surrogate Motherhood: Happy
Breeder Woman;" "Human Slavery," in McCuen, supra note 17 at c. 11; and Infertility: Women
Speak Out (London: Pandora Press, 1989).
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characteristics. 67 Suppliers from historically disadvantaged groups might
face discrimination in such a market. Economically disadvantaged
demanders would also be unable to obtain materials with the moredemanded characteristics. In the fetal tissue context, if histocompatibility were to become a factor in fetal tissue transplants,
economically disadvantaged demanders with rare tissue types might be
unable to secure a supply of this important resource.68
A more general critique of social contractarianism from a
feminist perspective is offered by Carole Pateman. 69 Pateman argues
that the social contract tradition, even in modern Rawlsian form,
involves one of two equally unacceptable sets of implications for women.
First, as full individuals in their own right, women can now argue for full
equality with men, which entails demanding that they be treated "just
like men." But in societies like ours, with a long patriarchal tradition of
subordination of women, demanding to be treated just like men involves
acquiescence in social structures that many women feel are inherently
unjust. In the reproductive exchange context, this could entail
acceptance of male-oriented concepts of private property rights,
freedom of contract, and a genetic notion of parenthood as applied to
reproductive materials and services. 70 Second, in Rawls's original
position, where natural endowments are not known, the de-gendered
individuals are so abstracted from real-life human beings that it is not
clear what set of social structures would be agreed on to regulate their
reproductive processes. Additionally, to the extent that these structures
reflect androgyny rather than patriarchy, arguably important differences
in the way men and women view their role in these processes will
become lost.
Either of these two sets of implications is uncongenial to many
.women, in both reproductive exchange and other contexts, because these
implications fail to recognize, for example, the uniqueness of women's
67

Sperm banks purporting to produce children with "superior" characteristics are already in
existence. See Note, "Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?" (1981) 94 Harv.L.
Rev. 1850.
68

See, generally, A.L.Caplan, "Blood, Sweat, Tears, and Profits: The Ethics of the Sale and
Use of Patient Derived Materials in Biomedicine" (1985) 33 Clinical Res. 448. See also R. Titmuss,
The Gift Relationship:From HumanBlood to SocialPolicy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971).
69
The Sexual Contract(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
70 To many feminists, viewing children as objects of a parental "right to reproduce" or as
property to be possessed, reflects offensive, patriarchal notions of the family centred around rights
and ownership: M. Ryan, "The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique"
(July/August 1990) 20 Hastings Center Rep. 6 at 9-10; and K.T. Bartlatt, "Re-Expressing
Parenthood" (1988) 98 Yale LU. 293 at 339.
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role in gestation and childbirth, and other issues central to the autonomy

of women, such as the just allocation of responsibility for child care, care
of the elderly, and domestic labour more generally. 71

We now proceed to review a set of theories that in one respect or
another challenge in important ways the individualistic underpinnings of
all three liberal theories reviewed above. The first set of such theories,
while sharply different from one another in various respects, are placed
under the general rubric of "essentialist" theories, because they share
the claim that there is some essence to human nature or some core of
community values that unconstrained individual choices in the
reproductive context may be inconsistent with and may indeed violate.
72
C. EssentialistTheories

1. Religious perspectives
Members of some religions take the view that the nature of the
procreative function has been divinely decreed and that worldly laws or

practices at variance with this conception contravene God's will. For
example, the Catholic church officially takes the view that sex outside of
marriage is immoral, that sex within marriage should not be separated
from the act of procreation, and that marriage is a sacred union for life
that the parties should not be free to terminate. Life is also thought to
begin at conception, requiring that the conceptus be treated with the
same respect and concern that is accorded to a living child. These views
lead to opposition to pre-marital sex, contraception, abortion, and
71 On the other hand, Susan Moller Okin has recently defended Rawis's theory against these
criticisms: "Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice" in C. Sunstein, ed., Feminism and
PoliticalTheory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) 15. She contends that the original
position requires political actors to be empathetic and to take the standpoint of the disadvantaged.
Choosers are not required to think as if they were "disembodied nobodies" (at 34), but are instead
required to "think from the position of everybody, in the sense of each in turn" (at 30). On this view,
the original position is by no means an abstraction from difference, but is instead rooted in "an
appreciation and concern for social and other human differences" (at 31). See also L. McClain,
"'Atomistic Man' Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence" (1992) 65 S. Cal.
L Rev. 1171. See also Kymlicka, supra note 39, who shares some of Okin's views, but also offers a
critique of her defence of Rawls. Kymlicka argues, at 93, that Okin does not address the issue of
what forms of family life would be endorsed by people in Rawls's original position.
72 It is important to note that the writings of some theorists-particularly feminists within the
"essentialist" category--could also be grouped within the "contingency feminist" category. That is
to say, some writers offer arguments from both perspectives to develop their objections to
exchanges of reproductive materials and services. Accordingly, the citation of a writer within the
"essentialist" category does not imply that the writer's views are necessarily so restricted.
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divorce, and they also lead to strong opposition to most of the new
reproductive technologies where reproductive functions can occur
outside of the marital and sexual relationship of husband and wife. 73
This perspective leads to opposition to the new reproductive
technologies perse, rather than to the commercialization of reproductive
materials and services itself.
However compelling these views may be to adherents of the
religion in question, given the separation of church and state that is
fundamental to most liberal democracies, it is not at all clear why the
state should feel obligated to act on these views and require obedience
to these dictates by members of society who do not subscribe to them.
This is without questioning, of course, the right of individuals who hold
these views to act upon them in their own lives. Also, many feminists
view these religious positions as sanctifying traditional conceptions of
the family, which have often entailed the subjugation and oppression of
women.
2. Natural law theories
Natural law or natural rights theories, which have come in many
different forms over the ages, trace back to Aristotle, who posited that
"man's" correct nature or telos could be determined through rational
reflection on the essential nature of the person. Aristotle supported this
moral theory with a metaphysical biology that depends, in the last resort,
on a mystical conception of nature as a system tending to perfection.
According to contemporary natural rights theorists, such rights embody
the conditions necessary for the flourishing of "man" as the distinctive
creature that "he" is: we discern the content of these rights by
considering the distinguishing marks of the human species and the
circumstances in which these characteristics or powers might best be
realized. 74 However, as John Gray points out, there is an arbitrariness in
the moral judgments that go into any selection of these distinguishing
marks of "man." Gray suggests that these difficulties in natural law
doctrine can be illustrated by a thought experiment:
Let us suppose we are in a position (one we may well occupy in the middle future, given
the possibilities of genetic engineering) to alter the content of man's nature or essence:
how could the natural law ethic of realizing man's distinctive power help us here? We
might refuse to alter human nature, and be wise to do so; but the reason can hardly be

73 See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, supranote 50 at 31-35.
74

See J. Finnis, NaturalLaw andNaturalRights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
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645

that human nature as it is embodies moral perfection. If it does not-and few would dare
claim that it does-then we must choose which human powers to foster and which to

repress or remould. No ethic which appeals solely to an idea of realizing the distinctive
human powers can help us with the radical choice as to, "Which essence shall man

have?" 75

The nature of these difficulties is readily demonstrated by a
review of different natural law theories as they pertain to reproductive
relationships. For example, Aristotle himself defended slavery and the
natural inferiority of women. Locke, and other early social
contractarians, assumed either as a matter of divine will or biology that
marriage and the family exist in the natural state ... that the attributes of individuals are
sexually differentiated ... [that] men naturally have the characteristics of free and equal

beings [and that] [w]omen are naturally subordinate to men, and [that] the order of
nature is reflected in the structure of conjugal relations. 7 6

This natural law perspective could also be used to argue that the use of
the new reproductive technologies and commodification of reproductive
materials and services is "unnatural," because these modes of
reproduction are contrary to the nature of sexual procreation within the
marital relationship. Natural law objections to the exchange of fetal
tissue would also reflect concerns about moral complicity in, and
encouragement and legitimization of, abortion and the use of the fetus
as a means to another's ends.77
In the last century, and occasionally today, social Darwinists and
eugenicists have propounded theories of the natural genetic inferiority
of non-white races. 78 Currently, many sociobiologists claim that the
desire to reproduce reflects an inherent genetic trait, observable in most
animal species, to maximize individual reproductive success and
perpetuate genetic lineages. 79 Unlike other natural law theories, this
75
76
77

Gray,supra note 16 at 48.
Pateman, supra note 69 at 53.
See, for example, J.T. Burtchaell, "University Policy on Experimental Use of Aborted Fetal

Tissue" (1988) 4 IRB: Rev. Human Subjects Res. 7; "The Use of Aborted Fetal Tissue in Research:
A Rebuttal" (1989) 2 IRB: Rev. Human Subjects Res. 9; A.R. Bauer, "Bioethical and Legal Issues
in Fetal Organ and Tissue Transplantation" (1989) 26 Hous. L. Rev. 955; and Robertson, supra note

27, in which some natural law arguments are canvassed, although Robertson is opposed to them.
78
D. J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986).
79 See, for example, M. Daly & M. Wilson, Sex, Evolution, and Behaviour, 2d ed. (Belmont,
Ca.: Wadsworth, 1983); R.D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems (New York: Aldine De
Gruyter, 1987); C. Crawford, M. Smith & D. Krebs, eds., Sociobiology and Psychology (Hillsdale,

N.L: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1987); and P.W. Strahlendorf, Evolutionary Jurisprudence:
DarwinianTheoriesin Judicial Science (SJ.D. Thesis, University of Toronto Law School, 1991).
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perspective has been invoked to justify unconstrained commodification
of gametes, zygotes, and gestational services, because it is argued that
reproduction and, in particular, the perpetuation of a genetic tie, is a
pressing and inherent human need.
Many modern feminists would reject all of the foregoing
essentialist theories of the nature of the reproductive function. They
would see them as barely disguised efforts to rationalize the
subordination of women by confining women to conjugal relationships in
which their principal function is that of childbearer and rearer, and
excluding them from equal participation in civil society. However, some
modern feminists themselves propose a very different theory of the
reproductive process that could be described as "essentialist" in
orientation. For example, Margaret Jane Radin80 argues that permitting
the commodification of many human attributes, such as sexual or
reproductive functions, is inconsistent with essential conceptions of
human personhood or human flourishing.
This position was also strongly espoused by the Royal
Commission:
Commissioners believe it is fundamentally wrong for decisions about human
reproduction to be determined by a profit motive .... Commodifying human beings and
their bodies for commercial gain is unacceptable because this instrumentalization is
injurious to human dignity and ultimately dehumanizing. We therefore consider
commercialization of reproductive materials and reproductive services to be
inappropriate. 81

Pursuant to this view, the Commission recommended that selling,
purchasing, or charging fees for serving as a "broker" in connection with
the creation, exchange, and use of human reproductive materials,
including sperm, ova, zygotes, and fetal materials should be prohibited. 82
Further, the Commission asserted that "commercial preconception
[surrogacy] arrangements commodify women's reproductive functions
and place women in the situation of alienating aspects of themselves that
should be inherently inalienable. ' 83
Even non-commercial
arrangements were held to be objectionable because "the arrangement
still results in the commodification of a child and the reproductive
process" and is "offensive to the human dignity of the child." 84
80

Radin, supranote 5.

81

Royal Commission, supranote 1 at 55-56.

82 Ibid. at 108.
83 Ibid. at 683. See also Recommendations 199-205 and c. 23.
84

bid.at 689.
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Some writers go further and object to both commodification of
reproductive materials and services, and to the use of the new
reproductive technologies per se. Some feminist writers argue that these
technologies fragment the childbearing and childrearing process,
medicalize motherhood, and imply a loss of control by women of their
bodies and the birthing process.ls They reject what they perceive to be a
patriarchal view of reproduction as exclusively biological in nature, and
emphasize what they perceive to be the essentially relationalnature of
childbearing and childrearing.8 6 This view leads to a much more holistic
conception of reproduction, which at base rests on some essentialist
conception of "natural" motherhood.
The motherhood that is being celebrated on this latter view is
not the motherhood sanctified by earlier natural law theories that entail
the subjugation of women in traditional conjugal relationships, but the
caring and relational values that some feminists believe are distinctively
associated with the nature of womanhood. While this position converges
ironically with many of the other natural law views of the reproductive
function in opposing many aspects of the new reproductive technologies,
feminists who take this view are rightly concerned to stress that their
opposition focusses on the potential impact of these technologies on the
status and welfare of women, rather than on the status and welfare of
the fetus, on preserving traditional family structures, or on perpetuating
genetically-driven notions of parenthood.87 This view recognizes that
the new reproductive technologies per se and the commodification of
reproductive materials and services do have some positive, as well as
negative, effects on women. Positive aspects include the potential to
subvert traditional family structures by enabling, for example, single and
lesbian women to have children without a male partner, and the
potential to enable women who wish to pursue careers or other goals to
cryopreserve (freeze) zygotes during their youth for implantation later in
their lives. But it is also argued that the risks of reinforcing the
traditional view, that having children is a social or biological imperative
for women, outweigh many of the seeming benefits of commodification

85

See, for example, Rothman, supra note 8; B.K. Rothman, "Reproductive Technology and
the Commodification of Life" (1987) 13 Worn. & Health 95 [hereinafter "Commodification of
Life"]; Ryan, supra note 70; and K.P. Morgan, "Of Women Born? How Old Fashioned! New
Reproductive Technologies and Woman's Oppression," in Overall, supra note 23, 60.
86 See Ryan, ibid. at 10.
87

See, for example, J.G. Raymond, "Fetalists and Feminists: They are Not the Same," in P.
Spallone & D.L. Steinberg, eds., Made to Order: The Myth of Reproductive and Genetic Progress
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987) 58.
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and the technologies per se.88 Reinforcing the power of the medical
profession in the medicalization of pregnancy is also a concern. As
Gena Corea writes, "[i]ncreasingly, it is the contents of the container
that matter, not the container herself. Accordingly, obstetricians are
coming to view themselves as 'physicians to the fetus'."8 9
Just as this view reflects concerns that the new reproductive
technologies may devalue womanhood by viewing women as merely
containers or mother machines, there is a collateral concern that babies
will increasingly come to be seen as products that parents can in effect
"order," with desired characteristics, through control of genetic inputs. 90
Sperm banks purporting to offer genetically superior sperm, with
particular attributes, are already in existence. 91 The "commodification"
of children, like that entailed in treating women as breeding machines, is
equally subversive of the relational-rather than genetic-values that
many women regard as being the essence of womanhood and
motherhood.92 Thus, a rich notion of embodied identity is threatened by
the fragmentation of reproductive processes entailed in commodification
and many of the new reproductive technologies. 93 The provision of
88
89

Royal Commission, supra note I at 37.
Supra note 59 at 299.

90 See, for example, G.J. Annas & S. Elias, "Social Policy Considerations in Noncoital
Reproduction" in Milunsky & Annas, supra note 61, 147 at 156. These concerns are also shared by
many feminists within the "contingency" perspective.
91
Ibid. at 152; and Note, supra note 67.
92

Robert H. Blank, RegulatingReproduction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) at
90, though not writing from a feminist perspective, states the point well:
The emphasis on technological "perfection" raises questions concerning the purpose of
children in this generation. It is not surprising that terms such as "quality control" over
the reproductive process and children as "products" of particular techniques are
commonplace. With the increased availability of sex and characteristic selection
techniques, motivations for their application must be examined closely. There is a clear
danger of viewing children as commodities.
93 An interesting critique of this perspective is provided by Scott Altman in his article
"(Com)modifying Experience" (November 1991) 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 293. Altman assembles
arguments against what he terms the "modified-experience" claim-the idea that commodification
and the new reproductive technologies will harmfully alter sensibilities and attitudes such that
persons are products or objects to be produced, priced, purchased, used, and discarded. Altman
asserts that traditional humanistic values are not fragile, but rather tend to persist over time, even in
the face of potentially commodifying and dehumanizing practices of the present, such as paid
adoption, prostitution, and labour markets. He argues, at 333, that these "precedents" for the
reproductive technologies and commodification of reproductive materials and services demonstrate
that "[pjeople need not stop pricing to preserve the ability to think in terms other than price." In
short, Altman believes that fears about radical societal and relational disruption and harm to noneconomic humanistic and interpersonal values are largely alarmist and unfounded, and that the
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gestational services, which some feminists term "baby selling," is perhaps
the most widely-claimed example of the devaluation of the gestational
experience and fragmenting of the relationship between mother and
child. This type of exchange is said to be premised on a male model of
parenthood and contract, in which genetic ties are paramount, the best
interests of the birth mother94 and child are irrelevant in the face of a
contractual agreement, and babies are considered suitable commodities
to be priced, contracted for, and sold. 95
At the limit, one can conjure up scenarios of "genetic bazaars" in
the future-not unlike Aldous Huxley's Brave New World96-where all
or most reproduction is reduced to individuals buying or selling genetic
inputs into the reproductive process, maybe through specialized mailorder houses or laboratories, incubating embryos in artificial wombs, and
contracting out the childrearing process to modern-day equivalents of
wet-nurses, childcare workers, and day-care centres, where relations
such as those between mother and child, siblings and father, and parents
and extended family become non-existent in some cases and transitory
or highly attenuated in others. Pateman refers to this scenario as
"universal prostitution." 97
This brief review of various essentialist theories that bear on the
reproductive process underscores Gray's doubts that the question
"Which essence shall man have?" is capable of yielding any determinate
answer. Gray argues that because various -components of human
flourishing may often be in intractable conflict with one another, this is
decisive against any prospect of reviving a natural law ethics.98 While
there have been recent ambitious efforts to do so,99 they tend, as in the
past, to entail either relatively arbitrary assertions of the essence of
human nature, or claims about this essence at such a high level of
abstraction that they are essentially devoid of meaningful content. The
pluralism of views with regard to the meanings of parenthood, and issues
"modified-experience" claim, at least in its broad and simplistic form, should not be heavily relied
upon in policy formulation. See also Arneson, supra note 26 at 142-44.
94 The term "birth mother" refers to the woman who gestates and gives birth to the child,
regardless of genetic contribution.
95 "Commodification of Life," supra note 85 at 99, in which it is argued that women who
participate in gestational service agreements "have accepted the alienation of the worker from the
product of her labor, the baby like any other commodity does not belong to the producer but to the
purchaser." See also, Royal Commission, supranote 1 at 683.
96

(New York: Harper & Row, 1932).

97

Supra note 69 at 193.

98

Supra note 16 at 49.

99

See, for example, Finnis, supranote 74.
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surrounding the possible existence, or specification, of essential
differences between women and men (potentially attributable to
biological, or social, or a combination of factors), makes determination
of policies based on such premises a difficult, if not intractable, problem.
3. Conservative communitarian theories
Communitarian theories, while exhibiting diversity similar to that
of liberal theories and essentialist theories, typically reject the
"atomistic," "impoverished" pre-social individualism that is said to
characterize liberal theory, and the moral absolutism that is said to
characterize many essentialist theories. In our present context, two
major strands of communitarianism can be identified: one relatively
conservative in its implications, emphasizing the importance of
preserving traditional community values; the other much more radical,
viewing inherited social structures as often oppressive and looking to
imagine and realize future possibilities of alternative and more benign
social structures. We discuss the first in this section, and the second in
the next.
The first strand of communitarianism holds that while moral
norms may not be immutable or divinely ordained, and are instead
relative to given societies or particular periods of history, a substantial or
dramatic transformation of these norms may nevertheless lead to the
disintegration or destabilization of society; and society is entitled
collectively to adopt measures designed to protect its own moral
cohesion and to prevent the erosion of its essential common values.
This position was made famous by Lord Devlin in his reaction to the
British Wolfenden Committee which recommended, in 1957, that
homosexuality between consenting adults be decriminalized.100 Devlin
argued that the overwhelming majority of members of British society at
that time held the view that homosexuality was inconsistent with core
communal values, and that society was entitled to take collective action
to protect those values. In the reproductive exchange context, this
perspective could imply that a rapid transition to the use of new
reproductive technologies, and commodification of reproductive
materials and services, would undermine the institution of the family on
which society is based, and that the state would accordingly be entitled

100 Lord Devlin, The Enforcement ofMorals (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
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and commodification of
to prohibit the use of the technologies
10 1

reproductive materials and services.

H.L.A. Hart, in his famous critique of Devlin, 10 2 argued that

Devlin's position reduced all issues of morality to a question of whether
particular conduct makes the person on the Clapham omnibus feel sick.
Devlin's views, are, of course, strongly antithetical to classical liberal
views, 103 although they do share something in common with utilitarian
theories, in that the latter also emphasize maximizing the "good of the
many" even if this is at the cost of overriding the preferences of the few.
It is clear that moral majoritarianism is the animating force behind the
views of many moral conservatives in North America today on issues like
abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and the new reproductive
technologies, and can claim legitimacy from a political system that is
premised on majority rule. Nevertheless, the moral premises of
conservative communitarianism are antithetical to many feminists, who
see them as a rationalization for oppressive traditional family structures
and gender inequalities. 10 4
A rather more sophisticated line of communitarian reasoning has
recently been developed by scholars such as Michael Sandel,105 Alasdair
MacIntyre, 1°6 Charles Taylor, 107 and others.108 Taylor's recent book,
The Malaise of Modernity, usefully exemplifies the orientation of this line
of thinking. Taylor identifies three overarching concerns about the
101 For an example of a conservative communitarian perspective on the use of donor
materials, see G.R. Dunstan, "Moral and Social Issues Arising from A.I.D." (Symposium on Legal
and Other Aspects of Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID) and Embryo Transfer, 1 December
1971) in Law and Ethics of A.LD. and Embryo Transfer (Ciba Foundation Symposium 17 (new
series)) (Amsterdam: Associated Scientific Publishers, 1973) 47.
102

Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963).

103 However, conservative communitarians might argue tendentiously in reply that liberalism
itself is an ideology which is imposed upon all communitarians who disagree with it.
104 See M. Friedman, "Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating the Community," in
Sunstein, supra note 71, 143.
105 Liberalismand the Limits ofJustice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
6
10 After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1981).
107 Philosophy and the Human Science: PhilosophicalPapers 2 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), especially "Atomism" at 187; Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1989); and The Malaiseof Modernity (Toronto: Anansi, 1991).

108 M.A. Glendon, Rights Talk-The Impoverishment of PoliticalDiscourse (New York: Free
Press, 1991); A. Etzioni, The MoralDimension (New York: Free Press, 1988); R.N. Bellah et aL,
Habitsof the Heart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); and R.N. Bellah et aL, The Good
Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
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quality of moral life and moral decision making in modern societies:
first, a preoccupation with possessive individualism (to use C.B.
Macpherson's phrase); 109 second, a preoccupation with narrowly
instrumental reasoning; and third, a detachment or disengagement by
individuals from active participation in the political life of their
community. For Taylor, the radical individualism sanctified by classicalliberal theory leads to a facile form of soft relativism or moral
subjectivism, where "doing your own thing," or individual choice,
becomes the dominant moral value in its own right. According to
Taylor, this leads to an individualism of anomie, where moral reasoning
or moral criticism becomes impossible in the absence of the acceptance
of some self-transcending values. In the absence of acceptance of such
values, whether they derive from God, nature, history, or from collective
participation in a process of self-definition, we are left with social
atomism and a culture of narcissism. According to Taylor, narrowly
instrumental reasoning leads to a preoccupation with individual selfinterest and a devaluation of the impacts of one's actions and uses of
technologies on relationships with others, and indeed on nature itself.
By Taylor's line of reasoning, one could argue that use of the new
reproductive technologies and commodification of reproductive
materials and services entail an undue focus on the desires of particular
individuals, without according adequate consideration to the impact of
individual decisions on the families and children affected, or their
impact on the values of the larger community.
The detachment of individuals from active participation in the
political life of their community undermines any ability to forge a
consensus on common public projects, endeavours, or goals, which in the
reproductive exchange context could be offered as a partial explanation
for the policy paralysis engendered by the vast diversity of individual
viewpoints on this subject. This concept of communitarianism is not
necessarily either conservative or radical, although the appeal to selftranscendent values tends to emphasize "essential" human values and
the importance of preserving continuity and stability in social structures.
Even accepting this more nuanced understanding of human
beings as social creatures situated in and shaped by social relationships
and contexts, the core problem presented by Devlin's moral
majoritarianism still remains: to what extent should a community,
whatever the degree of public or political participation by its citizens, be
entitled to adopt a uniform and monolithic conception of the good life
and impose it on individual members of that community who do not
109 The PoliticalTheory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
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share that conception? This dilemma is easily illustrated in the new
reproductive technology context. While many individuals today may be
offended by, and reject, Lord Devlin's proposition that a homophobic
society is entitled to impose its views on individual members who do not
share these views, is it any more appropriate for a community, a majority
of whose members are opposed to all or many forms of the new
reproductive technologies or commodification of reproductive materials
and services for whatever reasons, to impose its views on individual
members of the community who do not share them?
D. Radical Contingency Theories
1. General
A much more radical strand of communitarianism would reject
out-of-hand the classical liberal assumption that individual identities and
preferences exist in a pre-social state, and would instead view all or most
preferences as reflecting the contingencies of history, social structures,
economic organization, and politics.110 On this view, preferences are
treated as endogenous, not exogenous, to the social structures in which
individuals find themselves situated. Thus, rather than asking the
question, "how can society's institutions best establish the conditions for
the satisfaction of existing individual preferences?" (as all liberal
theories would ask), one would ask the very different question, "what
kinds of social structures and institutions do we collectively feel are most
appropriate to enable 'true' preferences to be realized?"111 In other
words, the second question implies that the causality between individual
preferences and social institutions is reversed.
In discounting the validity of manifest, or apparent, individual
preferences, which are viewed as adaptive, endogenous, or socially
constructed, radical contingency theories encounter some serious
difficulties. For example, if individual preferences can be viewed as
lacking independence and validity for these reasons, why would we not
110 For a review of theories of adaptive or endogenous preferences, see C. Sunstein, "Legal
Interference with Private Preferences" (1986) 53 U. Chic. L. Rev. 1129 [hereinafter "Legal

Interference"]; and "Preferences and Politics" (1991) 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3.
111 Debra Satz, in "Markets in Women's Reproductive Labour" (1992) 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
107 at 131, asks a similar question: "[w]e have to ask: [w]hat kinds of work and family relations and
environments best promote the development of the deliberative capacities needed to support

democratic institutions?"
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suppose that the preferences of legislators, bureaucrats, regulators, and
judges would not be subject to the same infirmities? Why is this not a
quintessential case of the socially constructed blind leading the blind,
unless we make the precarious assumption that when we aggregate
preferences in collective decision making, all the sundry flaws and biases
in individual preferences get neutralized in one "genuine" collective
preference? As Eric Mack puts the point (perhaps too strongly), "if the
problem is that people are such knaves or fools that they cannot
recognize or will not choose these components of human flourishing,
then who is to be entrusted to design and enforce limitations of the
market that will grant genuine personhood and community?" 112
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the concept of a liberal
democracy also rests on the assumption that a group of decision makers
(ie., the legislature, subject to Constitutional constraints and
entitlements) can collectively determine laws to govern a heterogeneous
society. Law necessarily, and almost by definition, constrains the variety
of "life choices" open to individuals in the interest of preserving
harmony amongst groups and individual members of society.
Disagreements between radical contingency and liberal autonomy
theorists would seem to centre around the question of how to ascertain
(and liberate) "true" preferences, rather than the question of whether to
impose majority preferences on those who disagree with them (which is
the autonomist's critique of conservative communitarian theories).
There is a further and in some ways more fundamental
circularity problem with theories of endogenous preferences:
presumably, any form of social, economic, political, or legal organization
will be vulnerable to the same claim, so that the validity of individual
preferences will be open to challenge ad infinitum by those holding
decision-making authority or other members of the community with
different views. One might, of course, argue in Aristotelian fashion that
participation in non-hierarchical, dialogic, processes of collective selfdefinition confer a special validity on preferences arrived at in this
manner, although it seems unlikely, given the kind of secular and
pluralistic society in which we live, that consensus could be reached on
anything approaching a complete conception of the conditions necessary
to facilitate true human flourishing. Nevertheless, it may be possible to
identify or devise incremental mechanisms that would enable individuals
and communities to consider and evaluate current or traditional

112 Mack, supra note 53 at 223.
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preferences in the light of new information, options, and experiences. 113
For example, further increases in workplace options available to women,
with the concomitant potential for securing an independent source of
income, may, as they have over the past thirty years, offer some women
the opportunity to re-examine their former "preferences" to remain in
uncongenial relationships, to be the sole provider of domestic services in
the home, or to act as gestational service providers.
We now turn to a particular version of social contingency theory,
radical-or more accurately "transformative"-feminist theories, which
have particular implications for the reproductive exchange context.
2. Contingency feminist theories
As noted above, many feminists view the new reproductive
technologies as threatening women by reinforcing historical gender
1 14
stereotypes that see women principally as breeding machines.
However, some feminists are cautious about accepting essentialist claims
about the nature of womanhood or motherhood. 115 These essentialist
views largely rest on the notion of inherent differences between men and
women-in the present context, differences in the value that women
place on relationships, care giving, and nurture. These values have been
16
given much prominence in work by scholars such as Carol GilliganI
who, in her research on the developmental patterns of young boys and
girls, found that girls valorize notions of care giving and altruism in
relationships while boys emphasize an ethic of justice and rights.
However, it is not clear that Gilligan claims that these are essential or
inherent differences, as opposed to differences engendered by
environmental influences. While Gilligan's work has led some feminists
to claim that women have an inherently different form of moral
development, other feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon argue
differently:

113 Monitoring, evaluating, and responding to new technologies as they emerge is one of the

functions of the Royal Commission's proposed National New Reproductive Technologies
Commission: supra,note 1 at c. 5.
114 Corea, supranote 59.
115

See S. Sherwin, "No Longer Patient: Feminism and Medical Ethics" (Feminism and Law
Workshop, University of Toronto Law School, 7 February 1992); and J.G. Raymond,
"Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman" (Hastings Center Report
November/December 1990).
116 In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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For women to affirm difference, when difference means dominance as it does with
gender, means to affirm the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness .... So I am
critical of affirming what we have been, which necessarily is what we have been permitted
.... Women value care because men have valued us according to the care we give
117
them.

In a similar vein, the question of women's altruism as a
motivation for participation in reproductive exchange relationships must
be addressed. Richard Titmuss, in his well-known book The Gift
Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy,118 argues that
important non-economic values such as a sense of altruism, reciprocity,
and community, are fostered by a donation rather than a commercial
system of blood supply. He argues that Britain, which traditionally
depended on a system of voluntary blood donations for transfusion
purposes, outperformed the United States, which traditionally relied
more on commercial payment for blood, with respect to the quantity and
quality of blood supplied, the avoidance of severe shortages and
surpluses, and the overall fostering of the non-economic values noted
above. Janice Raymond, however, argues that the distinction between
commercial and altruistic arrangements in the reproductive exchange
context is suspect11 9 because women's participation may simply be a
reflection of a long history of subjugation and socialization, whereby
women have been induced or compelled to value themselves in
accordance with their reproductive abilities and to see themselves as
under an obligation to be caregivers, childbearers, or nurturers if this is
what serves men's needs.12 0 The Royal Commission also took this view
in recommending that even non-commercial surrogacy arrangements not
be sanctioned or encouraged.121 Thus, to the extent that patriarchal
family and social structures have induced women to accept, over time,
that their most appropriate role in life is as childbearers and
childrearers, we should not take these preferences as given, but rather
see them as a result of a long history of oppressive and biased
socialization processes (a position strikingly similar to that taken by John
Stuart Mill in his essay, The Subjection of Women).12 2 On this view,
117

Feminism Unmodifled: Discourseson Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1989) at 39. See also McClain, supra note 71.
118
Titmuss, supra note 68. For a rejoinder, see K. Arrow, "Gifts and Exchanges" (1972) 1
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 342.
119
Supra note 115.
12 0

See, for example, Rowland, supranote 39; and Raymond, ibid.

121 Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 689.
122 (London: Longmans, 1869).

1994]

Commercializationof ReproductiveMaterials

many feminists would contend that encouraging the development and
use of new reproductive technologies in many contexts, whether on a
commercial or non-commercial basis, carries serious threats to the status
of women, unless the contingencies of culture, society, economics, and
politics, which have conspired to subordinate women over history, have
123
first been addressed.
More specifically, it is argued that narrow conceptions of consent
or coercion typically espoused by classical liberal theory and neoclassical economics, which ask whether a particular proposal is a threat
or an offer, or whether the recipient is made better or worse off relative
to her starting point, 124 simply fail to recognize the social and economic
inequalities that leave women, in many contexts, with highly constrained
choices. In other words, a much more contextual conception of coercion
is required. If adopting this more contextual conception of coercion
leads to the view that most women are only prepared to contemplate
entering into exchange relationships, such as the supply of ova or
gestational services, because other avenues of self-fulfilment have been
systematically foreclosed to them, then these exchange relationships
should be prohibited.
It is also argued that disability, including infertility, is, in part, a
social rather than a purely medical or scientific construct 25
Medicalizing infertility by defining it as an "illness" or "defect" trades on
the fact that, historically, women have been induced to believe that
childbearing and rearing is their primary role in life, and that if they
cannot perform this function they are a failure.1 26 The perception of
infertility as a tragic deficiency that can only be remedied by obtaining

123 See Pateman, supra note 69; RecreatingMotherhood, supra note 8; L.R. Woliver, "New
Reproductive Technologies: Challenges to Women's Control of Gestation and Birth," in R.H.
Blank & M.K. Mills, eds., Biomedical Technology and Public Policy (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1990) 43; and Satz, supra note 110.
124 See Trebilcock, supra note 25 at c. 4.

125 Recreating Motherhood, supra note 8 at 140-52; and C. Overall, Ethics and Human
Reproduction (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1987) at 139.
126 See Poff, supra note 24; and Corea, supra note 59 at 100-34. Robert Lee Hotz, in his book
Designs on Life (Toronto: Pocket Books, 1991), documents the "stories" of couples who have made

use of new reproductive technologies. Although Hotz is not writing from a feminist perspective,
many of the situations that he describes give support to feminist fears about the effect of new
reproductive technologies on women. For example, one woman confides:
I am dependant on the technology, and that is very scary. ... If it were not for that, I would
be a barren woman. In an earlier time, King Henry would have divorced me, I'd have my
head cut off. Everything I am doing is experimental. I have to trust in a doctor. The one
thing my husband can give me now is emotional support-that and good sperm.
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one's "own" child in some other way also detracts from the exploration
of other options open to women (and men) who wish to nurture, guide,
assist, and share themselves with others: these options include volunteer
and paid work with children in the community, spending time with the
children of friends and family, foster parenting, and even work with
other groups, such as teenagers or elderly persons. To the extent that
the new reproductive technologies carry the potential for reinforcing and
perpetuating the view that women are not fulfilled unless they are able
to conceive, bear, and raise children, the technologies are antithetical to
women's interests.
Also, it is argued both by some feminists and many non-feminists
that the role that technology has assumed in most modern societies
should not be taken as a given. For example, it is argued more generally
that the technological imperative induces us to see everything in the
world, including nature and the environment, as simply a resource to be
exploited, and that prescriptive (as opposed to holistic) technologies
generate a culture of compliance. 127 Specifically, in the context of the
new reproductive technologies, it is argued that the technological
imperative encourages society to see the reproductive faculties of
women as simply another resource to be exploited or "plundered." 128
Diversion of social resources to technologies designed to produce babies
not only objectifies and devalues both women and children, but also
draws resources away from pressing women's concerns such as pay
equity in the workforce, adequate social assistance benefits for
disadvantaged women (such as women whose child care commitments
preclude them from workforce participation, and elderly and disabled

127 See U. Franklin, The Real World of Technology (Montreal: C.B.C. Enterprises, 1990);
Taylor, supra note 107; M. Adas, Machines as the Measureof Men (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1989); and J. Eliul, The TechnologicalSociety (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).
128 See M. McNeil, "Reproductive Technologies: A New Terrain for the Sociology of
Technology" in M. McNeil, I. Varcoe & S.Yearley, eds., The New Reproductive Technologies
(London: Macmillan, 1990) 1; and J.Murphy, "Egg Farming and Women's Future" in R. Arditti,
R1D. Klein & S.Minden, eds., Test-Tube Women: What Future ForMotherhood? (Boston: Pandora
Press, 1984) 68. Janice Raymond, in "Of Eggs, Embryos and Altruism" (1988) 1 Reprod. & Gen.
Eng. 281 at 283, argues in the fetal tissue context that
[fletal tissue is becoming increasingly important to all sorts of high-tech medical research
to what I call "Rambo" medicine. Rambo medicine is based on male heroic technical
prowess that requires more high tech, more high drama, more high publicity, more high
funding, and more high risk for more women, with little immediate success-but of
course, thepromise of it. Rambo medicine, like messianic religion, is always promising a
future that is yet unrealized. Rambo medicine is a medical eschatology of things to come.
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women), and day care 2 9 The tendency to focus medical and
technological attention on women's bodies is exacerbated in the present
context by the fact that the medical profession is male-dominated, and
so combines in a single mind-set both the narrowly instrumental view of
the role of technology and a patriarchal view of the role of women in
society 130
It is argued further that capitalist institutions, historically and
currently still dominated by men, conceive of all interactions and
relationships as dominated by concepts of private property rights and
freedom of contract, where anything can be bought or sold, if there is a
willing buyer and seller, without regard to how the commodification of
human faculties, or resulting children, may dramatically transform, in a
broader systemic sense, social relationships over time. Finally, a
straightforward political argument might be made for constraining the
new reproductive technologies, at least in the short run: to the extent
that these threaten the dominant role historically played by women in
the childbearing and rearing process, whatever the rights and wrongs of
this role, women should not give up this political "card"-perhaps their
major card-until equality has been secured in other significant
domains.
On this view, it is impossible to determine what role should be
assigned to the new reproductive technologies without first attending to
the surrounding contingencies of history, culture, society, economics,
and politics, which cumulatively account for the subordinate status of
women. As MacKinnon states in the conclusion to a recent book, "[a]
feminist theory of the state has barely been imagined; systematically, it
has never been tried."1 3 1 According to Pateman, "new anti-patriarchal
roads must be mapped out to lead to democracy, socialism, and
freedom." 13 2 However, these goals can scarcely be claimed to constitute
a concrete agenda for action, given the deep ambiguities surrounding
each of these concepts. Nevertheless, if the contingencies that account
for present gender inequalities were to be more effectively addressed,
some contingency feminists might be more agnostic than feminist
proponents of "natural" motherhood as to the role that should then be

129 See Woliver, supra note 123 at 50-52; and R.D. Klein, "What's 'New' about the 'New
Reproductive Technologies?" in Corea et al., supranote 39, 64 at 68-69.
130 Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 32-34.
131 Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989)
at 249.
132 Supra note 69 at 233.
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assigned to both commodification and the new reproductive
technologies per se.133 It is possible that in this more ideal world,
contingency feminists, who of course strongly emphasize the right of all
women (including historically disadvantaged women such as members of
ethnocultural minorities, Third-World women, and lesbian and single
women) to make choices about the control of their own bodies, would
find substantial convergence with strong autonomy proponents,
including liberal feminists, who argue that these decisions should be the
personal prerogative of individual women.
However, the immediate dilemma faced by contingency feminists
is the "double-bind" problem that is entailed in the transition from the
non-ideal world to a more ideal world. According to Radin,134 in
moving to a world where truly autonomous individual choices are
possible, it is often difficult to decide whether society should, in the
interim, adopt a set of policies that heavily constrain the ability of
women (and men) to utilize or participate in potentially harmful
activities on the grounds that, for the time being, fully autonomous
choices (reflective of true preferences) are not possible. Some
autonomy theorists might argue that this risks a new form of
authoritarianism or paternalism (parentalism) not sharply dissimilar
from that entailed in the position that Lord Devlin took on
homosexuality. Moreover, it is possible that stringent constraints on
participation in exchange relationships relating to the new reproductive
technologies might risk, in the short run, implying that women are
incapable of making choices about their lives, thereby perhaps
reinforcing rather than undermining gender stereotypes about the
capacities or incapacities of women to participate fully as equal moral
agents in all aspects of social life. Yet the second horn of the dilemma is
that if potentially harmful activities such as the commercial exchange of
reproductive materials and services, and indeed the proliferation of.
reproductive technologies more generally, are not constrained in the
short term, we may risk further exacerbating the disadvantages that
women face in contemporary society.

133
See Satz, supra note 111; and Rowland, supra note 39. Robin Rowland writes, at 80, that
"[i]f these technologies were in the hands of women whose bodies they most intimately affect, we
may be able to utilize them to free women and give them new choices. But past experience teaches
us that the control of women's bodies is a continual battleground of the sexes."

134 Supra note 5.
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E. Conclusions
Between the extremes of the atomistic individualism and
narcissism arguably entailed by classical liberalism, the moral absolutism
arguably associated with many forms of essentialism, and the
indeterminacies arguably entailed by many contingency theories, where
are we left at the end of the day in terms of identifying some normative
signposts that might guide us in decisions regarding the regulation of the
new reproductive technologies? This question is rendered particularly
intractable not only because different members and groups in the
community will have different and strongly held views as to which of
these perspectives represents the most appropriate normative
framework within which to evaluate the new technologies, but also
because many individuals will feel simultaneously attracted to the values
which are represented in many of the normative perspectives reviewed.
That is to say, not only do policymakers face the not unfamiliar problem
of different groups in the community taking different positions on the
issues at stake, but many individuals themselves may also feel internally
torn and anguished over the value conflicts that the issues in this context
present. This suggests the exercise of some prudence in policy
formation: marginal or incremental change that permits both
reversibility or further change in the light of accumulating experience,
rather than quantum leaps into the unknown, seems a sensible policy
orientation1 3 5
However, in determining public policies towards these new
technologies, it seems crucial to bear in mind, in a non-dogmatic, nonrigid way, the difference between state action and individual and group
action. That is to say, the mere fact that the state has chosen not to act
to constrain private activity in a given context does not necessarily imply
that it endorses, sanctifies, or legitimates private decisions taken in these
domains. Rather, it leaves open a different kind of political
discourse-not a discourse directed at the state designed to induce or
foreclose state action, but a political discourse amongst each other, as
individuals and groups, whereby we can seek to persuade each other,
through moral argument, of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of
individual choices. Apart from the politics of state action, women's
groups, for example, can engage in political discourse with other groups
in persuading individual members to reconceive their public and private
roles. Similarly, women and men, as individuals and groups, can debate
135

See C.E. .indblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" (1959) 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79.
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amongst each other about how gender relationships can be more
constructively conceived. In other words, to view the politics
surrounding the new reproductive technologies as centred exclusively, or
even perhaps predominantly, on state action reflects an impoverished
view of the nature of political discourse.
This said, however, we are not so naive as to suppose that the
state can remain entirely neutral on the issues posed by the new
reproductive technologies. It is already, and will remain, heavily
implicated in the level and objectives of funding for medical research in
the area, in the provision of subsidized health care services, and in the
choice and administration of a legal framework that, to a greater or
lesser extent, facilitates or constrains these technologies. Also,
differences in endowments, including power differentials, which
individuals bring to exchange transactions, cannot be addressed solely by
market mechanisms and are unlikely to be redressed if the state remains
neutral in this area. Thus, any idealized liberal notion of complete state
neutrality on these issues is utopian. The state has no option but to
make a range of collective decisions that will clearly, one way or another,
significantly shape the scope and form that the new reproductive
technologies, and exchange relationships relating to them, will take in
the future.
Finally, despite the indeterminacies entailed in contingencyfeminist positions as to what role the new reproductive technologies and
exchange relationships might play if a more ideal, gender-equal world
were to be attained, their central point can scarcely be denied. That is,
to the extent that all the surrounding inequalities are left unaddressed,
to attempt to formulate normatively coherent and defensible responses
to the issues raised by the new reproductive technologies in abstraction
from the context in which these issues now confront us is a daunting and
perhaps impossible task. This is not an argument for paralysis-we have
already acknowledged that the state is not now, and cannot in the future
be, neutral over these issues-but it is an argument for viewing the
formulation of policy responses to issues raised by the new reproductive
technologies in a broader policy context, and for simultaneously
promoting a much more broadly conceived policy agenda that situates
the new reproductive technologies and exchange relationships in this
larger context.
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III. PROPOSED GUIDING PRINCIPLES
A. Introduction
Both as individuals and as a community, we do not operate
within a one-value view of the world. Most of us simultaneously espouse
autonomy, efficiency, distributive justice, relational, and probably other
values. The task that we confront, as individuals and as citizens, is how
to reconcile, or weigh, these values in particular contexts. While we do
not pretend to be able to offer a meta-theory that weighs these values in
some general social welfare function, in the particular context of the
commercialization of reproductive materials and services we believe that
there are elements in each of the major normative perspectives reviewed
above that justify recognition, in a normatively defensible and coherent
legal framework, for regulating this class of activity. This is not to claim
that these perspectives can be reconciled in all major respects, or that a
compromise among them can best be justified as a necessary evil in
order to secure some minimum necessary level of political consensus to
support some set of public policies. While it may be true that a
compromise will secure the necessary political consensus, we claim that
on normative grounds a number of the critical values represented in
these perspectives will properly inform the choice of public policies in
this context. We make no apologies for this form of "moral pluralism":
it is not unprincipled to optimize across a set of values, all of which, to a
greater or lesser extent, legitimately evoke our allegiance.
In the guiding principles we develop below, as our attempt at a
coherent synthesis of certain elements in the major normative
perspectives that drive debates over the new reproductive technologies,
four critical issues stand out amongst others as requiring resolution: (1)
the role to be assigned to financial compensation for the supply of
reproductive materials and services; (2) the extent to which suppliers or
demanders should be able to stipulate genetic characteristics in parties
with whom they enter into exchange relationships pertaining to
reproductive materials and services; (3) whether suppliers or demanders
should have a right to "opt-out" of any exchange relationship that they
have previously entered into; (4) the extent to which, if at all, access to
reproductive materials and services should be subsidized by the state.
We should frankly acknowledge at this juncture that the central
question of the scale of payments for reproductive materials and
services, and the extent to which these payments should be contractually
determined, is an issue that continues to cause some tension in

664

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 32 No. 4

viewpoints amongst the co-authors. Perhaps predictably, the male, and
highly predictably, the co-author most committed to a law and
economics perspective, is less convinced than his co-authors of the need
136
for as stringent a set of constraints as the latter feel are warranted.
However, the arguments on both sides of this issue are fully canvassed,
and readers will have to form their own judgments.
B. The FourPrinciples
1. The principle of uniqueness
a) Blood and kidneys
The first principle is that reproductive material and services are
unique and must be regulated in a manner different from that which may
be appropriate for other bodily materials, regenerative (such as blood)
or non-regenerative (such as organs), 3 7 The lack of analogies becomes
apparent when one considers the difference between peoples' attitudes
to blood and organ donation and their feelings about donation of
reproductive material. For example, it is common for blood donors to
sport a sticker in the shape of a drop of blood on their lapels after
making a donation; but one has difficulty imagining men wearing a
sperm sticker, or couples wearing matching zygote stickers, following
donation of reproductive material. Currently, sperm suppliers seem
quite secretive; it is not a matter discussed in the workplace as is blood
donation. Organ donations are also different. While a large percentage
of citizens are willing to sign organ donation cards so that their organs
may be used after their death, many would feel differently about their
ovaries being extracted and their ova used for the creation of twenty or
thirty children. Spouses and other family members might also feel
disturbed at the thought of their partner's reproductive material being
used to create children related to that partner but unrelated to
136

See Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 29.

13 7

The GloverReport, supra note 30 at 32, explicitly recognizes the uniqueness of gametes and
the implications for suppliers:
[s]emen donation is not just like blood donation. By donating semen for these new
techniques, a man is partly responsible for bringing a new person into the world. The
potential donor needs time to consider his motives, and possible future regrets. Perhaps
a donation made by a young unmarried man is something he will later find difficult to talk
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themselves. These feelings would not be evoked by the donation of, for
example, kidneys.
b) The personalaspect
The traditional connection of reproductive material with
sexuality, usually thought of as a private and personal matter, is another
factor in peoples' reluctance to treat reproductive material as they would
organs or blood. Sociobiologists argue that humans, like other animals,
desire to bring offspring into the world to perpetuate their particular
genetic material,1 3 8 but the current shortage of sperm, ova, and zygotes
calls this argument into question: the very reason that we might consider
introducing commercialization is to induce individuals to overcome their
observed reluctance to part with their reproductive material. The reason
that few individuals currently volunteer to donate, even when donation is
painless and consumes a minimal amount of time (such as sperm
donation, which is less painful and time-consuming than blood donation)
and even when the material is already in existence (such as "spare"
zygote donation) can only be that people have strong personal feelings
and moral beliefs about their own genetic material. Decisions about
whether to assist in creating a unique new human being reflect a
combination of emotions and strongly held intellectual, spiritual, and
moral convictions.
Gestational services and fetal material have personal and unique
aspects also. Gestational services are unlike other physical labour, in
that the fetus is developing within-and, importantly, in connection
with-the woman's own body. The desire to experience pregnancy, and
to know that they have nourished the fetus and given birth to the child,
may be reasons why some female demanders prefer to make use of
supplied gametes and zygotes rather than adopt. The presence of strong
personal and moral convictions in the fetal tissue context are amply
demonstrated by the powerful emotions and variety of opinions evoked
by the abortion debate. Yet despite the range of disagreement on the
subject of abortion, we believe that there is a thread of commonality, in
that most individuals would agree that the fetus-and, in some contexts,
the zygote or embryo-is worthy of a degree of respect by virtue of its
biological status as a genetically-unique potential human life.

138

See supranote 79.
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c) "Need"and demandfor reproductivematerialand services
It is also clear that there are very real physiological and medical
distinctions to be drawn between the "need" for reproductive material
and services and the need for blood and organ donation. Demanders of
blood and organs often will die without them, but demanders of
reproductive material and services are, typically, physically sound and
are, in the case of reproductive material, more likely to continue to be
healthy if they do not receive the material they demand, i.e., to use
materials demanders must assume medical risks.139 While the
psychological pain of some childless individuals may be significant, it is
unlikely to be life-threatening, and some potential substitutes for a
genetically- or gestationally-related child are available.1 40
This
distinction between urgent physiological and medical need for blood and
organs and perceived psychological need for children requires that
demand for reproductive materials be evaluated on its own merits, and
not analogized to demand for other bodily materials. By contrast, the
demand for fetal material is analogous to the demand for blood and
organs, because fetal material may be necessary for the continuance of
an existing human being's life.
2. The principle of enablement (not inducement)
a) Arguments for and againstemphasizingdistributive concerns
Given the deeply personal and controversial nature of
reproductive material and services, our second principle-premised on
the fact that commercialization is likely to have powerful incentive
effects that may disproportionately induce the disadvantaged to
participate as suppliers-becomes especially important. Monetary
139

Inthe words of R. Snowden and G.D. Mitchell, The Artificial Family:A Considerationof
Artificialnseminationby Donor(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981) at 71:
[t]he donor is not giving semen to help other people in the same way that many of us
donate blood. Semen is being given for the purpose of creating a new human being
whereas blood is given to assist those who are already in existence and who need help.
The issues of personal and social responsibility surrounding the care of people who
already exist are very different from those surrounding the planned creation of a new
140 Adoption, foster parenting, and volunteer or paid work in childcare are among the options
available to those who wish to share their lives with children.
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inducements directed at overcoming strong convictions of a personal
and moral nature are inappropriate, and become more so when it is the
poor who will be disproportionately induced to participate. For
example, Cass Sunstein argues that laws should properly reflect the
majority's "preferences about preferences," or second-order preferences
at the expense of first-order preferences. 4
This
phenomenon-voluntary foreclosure of certain choices-is the political
analogue of Ulysses and the Sirens.1 42 Such measures may be regarded
as an effort by citizens to protect themselves against their own transitory
and perhaps misguided choices: this is a kind of pre-commitment policy.
The counter-argument, made strongly by Richard Posner-that
the supply of reproductive material, gestational services, and fetal
material would be only one more of many undesirable jobs filled by
society's poor-is unconvincing.1 43 It underestimates the unique nature
of this activity, and it could also be used to justify the opposite
conclusion-not imposing another undesirable burden on the alreadydisadvantaged poor. Posner also argues that paying the poor to perform
undesirable jobs is distributively just and non-exploitative because it
improves their lot in life by making them financially better-off relative to
their admittedly meagre alternatives. 144 However, this argument fails to
take into account the unique nature of the activity in question: it is
admirable to improve the financial circumstances of the poor, but at
what personal and moral cost to these persons? Other distasteful jobs
which one might take on for financial motivations, such as providing
janitorial services or garbage collection, are qualitatively different from
the provision of genetic or fetal material or gestational services. It is
distasteful to many to imagine a society where poorer persons seeking to
improve their lot in life are presented with a strong financial inducement
to sell their reproductive material or services to wealthier persons. It
would obviously be preferable to at least attempt to extend to poorer
persons a small part of the range of choices (including education, job
141 See "Legal Interference" and "Preferences and Politics," supra note 110 at 1169 and 12,
respectively.
142 See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979).

143 "The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood" (1989) 5 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 21 at 26.
144 bid. at 25-26. See also Posner, supra note 20. In the latter, Posner states, at 425, "[m]y
conclusion is that the technological revolution in reproduction has increased and will continue to
increase the full income of women relative to men." For further arguments that surrogacy contracts
are not exploitative of women with few other opportunities, see Wertheimer, supra note 26 at 22427; and Arneson, supra note 26 at 158-59.
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skills training, employment opportunities, daycare, etc.) that are
available to wealthier persons. If one were to adopt Posner's position,
one could quite readily justify postponing the adoption of progressive
social policies, such as the extension of the choices and opportunities
outlined above, until the poor had exhausted all income opportunities
from their other -natural endowments (including their reproductive
materials and capacities for gestational services).
Another argument made, ironically, by some feminists, is similar
to the Posnerian argument, differing only in the conviction that it would
be best, in an ideal world, if no one were to become a supplier: this line
of argument holds that since the supply of reproductive material and
services is a morally repugnant activity which ideally no one should need
to participate in, anyone who does so should be paid very well. 145 The
paradox of this argument is apparent: large payments will induce more
people to enter an activity which is already perceived to be undesirable.
There is also a short-sighted quality to this argument: paying a subset of
poor people to participate in undesirable activities may increase their
income but diverts attention from systemic inequalities in society and the
labour market-factors which cause people to become and stay poor.
Turning to primarily demand-side issues, Posner's argument that
in a system of unconstrained commercialization more suppliers would
enter the market, and that the ensuing competition would drive the price
of services down to (opportunity) cost, thereby making materials and
services more financially accessible to poorer demanders, is also highly
problematic. The market would generate differential pricing (such that
materials and services produced by persons of different racial
backgrounds and attributes would be priced differently), which could
potentially alter the way that we as a society perceive and value our
constituent members. Children produced from materials sold in such a
market might also come to see themselves as more or less valuable than
other children with different racial backgrounds and attributes. This
type of market would also offer a disproportionate share of the
increased selection of materials and services to wealthier demanders
who could afford to pay for the more highly demanded (and accordingly
more expensive) materials and services. Finally, a subset of poorer
demanders would be excluded from participation because they lack the
resources to pay market prices, even when these prices are close to cost.
The benefits that the less advantaged would derive from a system
whereby wealthier demanders exchange money for reproductive
145 This type of argument is discussed in M.A. Field, SurrogateMotherhood: The Legal and
Human Issues (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) at 26; and Shalev, supra note 38.
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materials from poorer suppliers, who risk physical and psychological
harm (and may be paid at a rate marginally above cost, particularly if
they do not possess highly demanded characteristics), while some poorer
demanders are unable to obtain materials at all, are unclear at best.
Faced with such difficulties, some might argue that an
unconstrained market on the supply side and state allocation or
subsidization on the demand side is a possible alternative. But a supplyside market would still generate differential pricing, and paying prices to
suppliers sufficient to clear queues of subsidized demanders could place
a serious strain on health care budgets, such that the financial feasibility
of state involvement in this area could well be called into question.
Thus, if some suppliers were well paid, it would not only be at the risk of
inducing them to overcome their moral convictions, but might also be to
the detriment of poorer demanders, who might lose state support if this
area of involvement becomes too expensive. Importantly, if state
involvement were to continue in this type of market, it would be to the
detriment of those individuals who would be deprived of other (perhaps
even life-saving) medical resources, due to the diversion of health care
resources to applications of the new reproductive technologies.
It is clear that monetary inducements will always
disproportionately affect the poor: even small sums may induce the
indigent to participate as suppliers, and it would be next to impossible to
offer enough money on a consistent basis to systematically induce the
wealthy. It is also apparent that the tax and transfer system (the mode of
income redistribution favoured by Rawls) is unlikely to remedy large
wealth differentials among potential demanders, or remedy the poverty
of many potential suppliers, so as to make access to a relatively
unconstrained market distributively just (at least in the foreseeable
future). In so far as we are particularly concerned about distributive
consequences when the subject matter in question has strong personal
and moral implications, it follows that unconstrained commodification of
reproductive material is unacceptable. However, banning the use of
supplied reproductive materials and services and fetal material also
seems a drastic measure. We would prefer to permit the exchange of
these materials and services, while attempting to anticipate and
constrain many of the possible negative effects. Accordingly, we are in
favour of what we have called "constrained commodification."
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b) Enablingaltruism
If the supply of materials and services is to be increased,
measures that do not involve monetary inducements (which may induce
the poor to bear a disproportionate share of the physical, psychological,
and moral costs entailed) must be considered. Appeals to altruism,
unlike financial incentives, would draw a relatively equal response from
all socioeconomic groups in society. However, while the wealthy can
afford to be altruistic (that is, they can afford transportation costs,
foregone wages, babysitting expenses, etc.), the less well-off (who are
also motivated by altruism) can ill-afford these basic expenses.
Therefore, it would seem appropriate to offer compensatory
payments-reimbursement for travel costs, out-of-pocket expenses, and
some basic time costs-in order to enable all persons who wish to
participate to do so. It is essential that these payments be "enabling"
only: they must be compensatory without having an inducement effect.
Compensation for a supplier's time is problematic, since we recognize
that, generally speaking, payments equal to an individual's opportunity
costs (the money that the individual would otherwise earn) may make
the individual indifferent between participating in the activity and
continuing in her or his normal employment, and payments in excess of
opportunity costs function as an inducement to participate in the
activity. We would suggest that compensation for a supplier's time be
set slightly below the minimum wage, with special provisions made for
those on social assistance and those not employed in the labour market.
This would achieve our goal of facilitating altruism by offering
compensation without causing inducement effects for the poor.
c) The researchsubject and adoptionanalogies
Our position with regard to compensation rather than
inducement receives support from the ethical recommendations of the
Medical Research Council of Canada (mRc) 14 6 and the Office of
Research Administration at the University of Toronto in their guidelines
with regard to use of human subjects for research.1 4 7 Research subjects
146 Guidelines on Research Involving Human Subjects 1987 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1987) [hereinafter MRc Guidelines].
14 7
B.M. Dickens, ed., Guidelines on the Use of Human Subjects (Toronto: Office of Research
Administration, 1979) [hereinafter University of Toronto Guidelines]. This study also contemplates
that special provisions will apply in case of a "significant" risk: it recommends, at 37, that in such a
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are in a position similar to that of de novo gamete, zygote, and fetal
tissue suppliers and of women providing gestational services: they are
incurring risks and expenses to participate in a medical procedure that is
not of direct therapeutic benefit to themselves. Since subjects do
experience some discomfort and inconvenience, and reap no direct
medical benefits from the procedures, it would seem unjust not to offer
compensation. However, the MRC and the Office of Research
Administration are concerned that when money is introduced, less welloff persons will be disproportionately attracted as subjects. 148 The
solution reached is to offer compensation for out-of-pocket expenses
and to pay for time at a rate no higher than the minimum wage-in
effect, to enable altruism by offering reimbursement for certain
legitimate expenses but not to offer inducements j 49 Both the concerns
and the solution are clearly very similar to our second principle.
Another analogy that is highly apposite is provided by the laws in
most jurisdictions that permit private adoption services. Here it is
common for adoption laws to restrict payments that can be made by
adoptive parents or agencies acting on their behalf to biological mothers
contemplating the possibility of giving up their unborn children for
adoption, to basic medical and living expenses.150 Presumably, these
laws are designed to ensure that women who might otherwise have
decided to keep their children are not unduly induced to give them up by
the prospect of large financial payments.

case "no one should be compensated financially for undergoing a significant risk. ... The risk to the
subject in such a case should be outweighed by a related, non-pecuniary benefit to the subject. Any
medical risk, for example, should be outweighed by both the probability and degree of a therapeutic
advantage."
148
MRC Guidelines, supranote 146 at 24-25; and University of Toronto Guidelines,ibid. at 30-33
and 36-37.
149
The University of Toronto Guidelines,ibid. at 37, conclude that "compensation must not be
so great that it is an excessive inducement. As a general rule, pro-rated compensation should never
exceed the hourly minimum wage. ... Moreover, it is noteworthy that even a small compensation
may be an unfair inducement to a person in financial distress;" see also the discussion at 36-37. The
uRc Guidelines, ibd., are based on the same principles-compensation for expenses and payment at
a level that does not induce persons to participate-but the Council, at 24, allows for compensation
for "reasonably assessed ... loss of wages;" see also the discussion at 24-25. This would presumably
result in paying poorer research subjects less money than wealthier research subjects, which seems
somewhat problematic. Both the University of Toronto Guidelines, at 37, and the MRc Guidelines, at
25, state that if subjects choose to withdraw before the project is completed, compensation should
still be given for the participation given.
150 See Posner, supra note 20 at 409. Posner, however, is critical of these financial ceilings.
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d) Justifiable "discrimination"

i) Supply side
An altruistic supplier of materials or services may be more likely
than a paid supplier to be truthful about the presence of geneticallylinked diseases in her or his family's history, and about her current state
of health,151 but even an honest supplier may not be aware that she or he
has a sexually-transmitted disease. We would therefore require all
prospective suppliers to undergo blood tests and other necessary medical
tests. 152 Psychological screening, designed to discover whether the
prospective supplier is able to understand the implications of supplying
materials or services and is consenting to the procedure, may also be
important.1 53
In the context of reproductive materials and services, it would
also seem reasonable to take account of concerns that the number of
children genetically related to one individual supplier not become large
enough that the children could unknowingly meet and have children of
their own together. This concern could be met by establishing a limit on
the number of children that one supplier could parent (including the
children that the supplier has produced for herself or himself).
Some studies have suggested that a central record-keeping
agency 54 be established to record information regarding the number of
151 This argument is made by Richard M. Titmuss, supra note 68 at 151 and passim. The Reid
Report,prepared by the combined ethics committee of two Canadian medical societies, suggests that
suppliers be informed that should a recipient bear a child that is handicapped because of the
suppfier's deliberate deception about family genetic history or personal medical history, the supplier
will be liable to support the child. If the supplier were honest, and yet a handicapped child was
born, the supplier would not be liable. This requirement would give suppliers a significant incentive
to reveal all that they know about their medical and genetic history: The Combined Ethics
Committee of the Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society and the Society of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists of Canada, Ethical Considerationsof the New Reproductive Technologies (Toronto:
Ribosome Communications, September 1990) (Chair: R.L. Reid) at 32 [hereinafter the Reid
Report]. However, the level of payment that we recommend is non-inducing, such that those who
choose to participate would not have an incentive to lie about their history.
152 For a discussion of precautionary screening in the context of sperm donation, see Royal
Commission, supra note 1 at 448-50 and Recommendations 83-103.
153 Those incapable of consenting, such as mentally handicapped persons, would not be
permitted to participate. For a discussion of the importance and content of counselling in the
context of the new reproductive technologies, see, for example, Royal Commission, ibid. at 460-65,
487-89, and Recommendation 99(e).
154 The Royal Commission, ibid. at 118-19, proposes that this is one of the functions that
would be performed by its proposed National Reproductive Technologies Commission.
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children that a given supplier has parented, and to inform recipients if
genetically-linked diseases develop in the supplier after the child has
been born.lss The supplier would also be informed if the child
developed genetically-linked diseases. This information could be
relayed through a central agency, without revealing names or other
identifying information. A central agency could also be used for the
initial matching of prospective suppliers and demanders, and for the
facilitation of continuing contact between the parties where this is
desired. We discuss this possibility in more detail below.
ii) Demand side
We would require prospective recipients of reproductive
materials and services, like prospective suppliers, to meet certain
minimum medical and psychological criteria. Some would argue that the
state ought not to set any requirements for demanders since the state
does not purport to restrict anyone from having children naturally.
Others might argue that use of supplied materials is more similar to
adoption than to natural reproduction, and that standards are routinely
set to screen adoptive parents. Regardless of whether natural parenting
or adoption is the better analogy, it is clear that the state does set
minimum standards for all parents once a child is born: the state may
assume custody of a child if its parents are subjecting it to abuse or
neglect. It would not seem unreasonable to require prospective
recipients to meet minimum conditions necessary for the safety of the
child. Those who would pose a threat to the child's safety might include,
for example, untreated hard drug addicts, sexual offenders, etc.
One could also imagine purely medical restrictions on access to
reproductive materials and technologies, and the therapeutic use of fetal
material: persons with a very low probability of conceiving or sustaining
the pregnancy, or benefitting from the transplant, might not be
permitted to participate (at least where the services are being subsidized
by the state). This would not be unlike the current practice of allocating
expensive medical resources such as organs for transplant, and use of
dialysis machines, only to those who have some probability of
significantly benefitting from them.
While some grounds for restricting access to reproductive
materials and services are legitimate, others are unjustifiably
155 See, for example, the Reid Report, supra note 151 at 33-35, with regard to the release of
non-identifying medical and genetic information.
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"discriminatory" in that they do not have a bearing on the demander's
ability to parent a child. We would argue (as does the Royal
Commission) that racial or ethnic background, socioeconomic status,
sexual orientation, and marital status of demanders ought to be included
among the grounds for discrimination that are considered
unjustifiable.1 56 That is to say, we would not, a priori, exclude
demanders from participation in exchanges on the basis of these
characteristics; the question of whether suppliers and demanders should
be permitted to "discriminate" by specifying which characteristics they
would require in an exchange partner will be discussed below.
ill) Spousal consent for reproductive materials and services
Another issue that arises is whether the consent of spouses or
partners ought to be obtained before suppliers or recipients are
permitted to participate in the exchange of reproductive material or
services. We are reluctant to require the spouse or partner's consent,
since this would significantly impair the autonomy of the supplier or
recipient. On the supply side, in situations where the materials in
question, such as gametes, involve the body of only one partner and the
material produced will be transferred to the demander, we would not
require spousal consent. It would seem reasonable to require the
consent of both partners in the case of zygote supply, because both
partners have contributed to the creation of the material.
The situation on the demand side is more complex, because a
child who will require financial support and emotional nurturance will
potentially be produced. It would seem severe to require the spouse or
partner of the recipient to provide support for the resulting child if he or
she was not aware of, or did not consent to, the use of supplied materials
or services; but, conversely, it would be highly unjust to permit a spouse
or partner to develop a relationship with the resulting child while
refusing to support it. The Reid Report responded to this problem by
recommending that a recipient be able to receive materials without her
spouse's consent; however, the doctor should tell the recipient that her
spouse will be informed of the proceeding, so that he can decide whether
to accept the responsibility of supporting the prospective child.157 We
156Royal Commission, supra note 1 at Recommendation 121.
15 7

The Reid Report,supra note 151 at 31, recommends that "[i]f the husband does not consent
a notation should be made on the wife's consent form and on the records. The husband should not
be named as father on the child's birth registration and no support obligations will be created." The
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would also suggest that relief from support obligations be available only
if the couple's relationship is terminated prior to the child's birth.1 58

Thereafter, current family law provisions may hold a person who is in a
parental relationship with a child responsible for supporting or
contributing to the child's support, regardless of a genetic or a
gestational relationship, and regardless of consent to conception. 159
3. The principle of constrained choice
a) Information and licensing
The third principle we propose is that a significant range of
choices be available to both suppliers and demanders. Autonomy
considerations would dictate that suppliers and demanders be given as
much discretion as possible to determine their own arrangements. In
order to make these choices, suppliers and demanders must be provided
with all relevant information about risks, costs, benefits, alternatives, etc.

We recognize that information "counselling" may be most effective
when it is administered by individuals who are sensitive to the particular
situation and concerns of the persons they are serving. We would
therefore recommend that the state establish minimum standards and
guidelines (establishing, for example, what information must be
provided and what screening criteria are to be applied), and grant
licences for individually- and group-operated clinics.160 In the context of
reproductive materials and services, one could imagine, for example,
religious or cultural groups, disabled persons, gay and lesbian
Ontario Law Reform Commission took a different approach, recommending that the husband or
partner be "presumed as a matter of law" to be the father of the artificially-conceived child, subject
to rebuttal, with the onus of proof on the person who would seek to rebut the presumption: Report
on Human ArtificialReproduction and Related Matters (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General,
1985), vol. 2 at 176-78 [hereinafter Ontario LRc Report].
158
It might also be necessary to rebut a legal presumption of paternity. For the conditions
under which a person is presumed to be the biological father of a child, see Ontario's Children'sLaw
ReformAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. 12, s. 8.
159 See, for example, Ontario's Family Law Act, R.$.O. 1990, c. F-3, ss. 1(1) and 31(1).
Section 1(1) includes within the definition of parent "a person who has demonstrated a settled
intention to treat a child as a child of his or her family." However, it must be understood that when
an order for support of a child is made, the Court "should ... recognize that the obligation of a
natural or adoptive parent outweighs the obligation of a parent who is not a natural or adoptive
parent" as one factor in determining the amount of child support that each party is required to pay:
s. 33(7)(b).
160 The Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 116-18, would assign such a function to its
proposed National Reproductive Technologies Commission.
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organizations, feminist groups, and persons from minority ethnic groups
meeting licensing standards and administering their own clinics. This
system would ensure that consistent standards are maintained, but that
suppliers and demanders from different backgrounds can ask questions,
share experiences, and participate in an environment that is comfortable
for them.
b) Entitlements and contracting
Another important role for the state is the establishment of
background entitlements and the designation of which entitlements can
be waived or contracted around. We are in favour of background
entitlements because they ensure a degree of certainty and
predictability, but we would permit contracting around certain
entitlements so as to provide individuals with as many choices as
possible. One entitlement would be a presumption of anonymity:
suppliers and demanders would be entitled to participate in exchanges
without contact with each other. This would protect the interests of both
parties in maintaining privacy and avoiding unwanted interference.
However, suppliers and demanders would be free to contract around this
entitlement and decide to meet and become acquainted, if they so
choose, before participating in the exchange of gestational services,
gametes or zygotes, or even fetal material. This proposal draws support
from recent developments in adoption practices: in some jurisdictions
(such as California, New Zealand, and Ontario), adoption agencies can
facilitate contact between birth parents and adoptive parents before and
after children are adopted. In some cases, birth parents and their
families maintain contact with adopted children and adoptive families on
a regular and long-term basis. 161 In Ontario, birth parents are not
accorded such entitlements by law; rather, arrangements for contact
between the birth family and the adoptive family are instances of
"contracting around" entitlements to confidentiality and privacy on the
part of both parties.
In our scheme, when allowing for the possibility of contracting
around entitlements, it is important to distinguish between agreements
that are reached ex ante and those that are reached ex post (that is,
agreements made before, rather than after, the materials are used or the
service commenced). It is important to strike a balance between
161 These practices were reported in J.Dineen, "Adoption Without the Secrets" The Toronto
Star (9 January 1993) GI and G5.
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allowing parties as much freedom as possible to make (and change)
arrangements to fit their particular needs, and recognizing the need for
parties to know what to expect of each other and to be able to predict
the consequences of their choices. For instance, it would seem
reasonable to allow all parties to an exchange of sperm to agree, er ante,
that the genetic father would receive pictures of the child but would not
visit, and it would also seem reasonable to hold the genetic father to that
agreement ex post, rather than to permit him to attempt to renegotiate
the agreement via the central agency, or attempt to contact the
demanders directly. If parties were not held to their agreements expost,
one could imagine that the central agency might be overwhelmed with
requests to renegotiate: suppliers and demanders might continue to
contact the agency repeatedly over long periods of time, and the costs of
administering a renegotiation process (in financial, bureaucratic, and
emotional terms) could be substantial. While these restrictions on
renegotiation may seem strict, it is important to recognize that they
apply only to situations in which the parties have chosen, ex ante, not to
exchange full names and addresses for the purpose of ex post
renegotiations. In other words, parties are still free to agree ex ante to
leave open the possibility of expost renegotiations, and to conduct these
negotiations among themselves rather than through the central agency.
Yet, while we believe that ex ante agreements ought to be
consistently enforced expost, we would add one significant qualification:
we would include in every ex ante agreement a non-waivable background
entitlement allowing suppliers
a period in which they could choose to
"opt out" of the agreement. 62 We would not allow parties to contract
around this entitlement because we believe that the entitlement is an
important way to safeguard the voluntariness of the agreement and to
recognize the possibility of subsequent regret. We draw again upon the
adoption analogy. Almost every jurisdiction in the Western world
prohibits birth mothers from consenting to an adoption within a
prescribed period after birth and permits consent given thereafter to be
revoked within a further prescribed period. Our position also gains
support from recent empirical literature in psychology and economics
which finds that people systematically place a higher cost on the

162 This is similar to the situation of research participants. It seems reasonable to permit an
opt-out since participation in the project is theoretically driven by altruism-if the subject changes
her mind about exercising her altruistic sentiments, she ought to be permitted to withdraw: mc
Guidelines,supra note 146 at 25; and University ofToronto Guidelines,supra note 147 at 27.
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reduction of existing endowments than foregone future benefits. 163 The
opt-out period would need to be sufficient to allow the supplier time for
second thoughts (ie., time for the supplier to rest and take steps to
recover herself emotionally after the birth, abortion, or gameteprocuring procedure). However, the period should not be so long that
undue hardship is caused to the demander (who must endure correlative
uncertainty). The number of days or weeks chosen for each type of
exchange should reflect a balance between respect for a legitimate
process of reconsideration or change of circumstance, and the need of
all involved for resolution and certainty. With regard to the exchange of
gestational services, it is relevant to note that in the context of adoptions
in Ontario the period is four weeks. 164
We would not permit an opt-out period for demanders because
the opt-out is premised upon the need to reconsider in light of physical
and psychological experiences occurring during the course of procuring
or creating the material; demanders do not share these experiences, and
it seems unreasonable for the supplier to undergo the risks involved in
producing the material (or, in the gestational services context, the baby)
only to have the demander opt out arbitrarily (perhaps, in the
gestational services context, because the baby was not exactly as
expected). But while demanders would not be permitted to opt out, we
would permit them to return unused reproductive materials or, in the
gestational services context, place the baby up for (subsequent)
adoption. The latter is a right which other parents already have, should
unforeseen circumstances, such as marital breakup, affect their ability or
desire to produce and rear the resulting child.
Should suppliers decide to opt out of the agreement, we would,
by analogy to rules applying to research subjects, allow suppliers to keep
payments earned up to the point of opt-out.165 Withholding
compensatory payments from suppliers makes it difficult for them to
163 See, for example, D. Katmeman, J.L Knetsch & R.H. Thaler, "The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias" (1991) 5 J. Econ. Persp. 193; "Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem" (1990) 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325; and J.L Knetsch, "The
Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves" (1989) 79 Am. Econ. Rev.
1277.
164
The birth mother is prohibited from giving consent to an adoption until seven days after
the baby's birth, and she is then permitted three weeks within which time she can change her mind:
ChildandFamily Services.Act, S.O. 1984, c. 55, ss. 131(3), (8).
165 In the words of the Medical Research Council of Canada, "[s]ubjects should not be
offered such rewards for participation as will constrict their freedom to leave a study.
Reimbursement should therefore be as expenses are incurred": MRC Guidelines,supra note 146 at
25; see also the University of Toronto Guidelines,supra note 147 at 37.
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terminate their participation because they have invested time, effort, and
out-of-pocket expenses in the exchange, in which they have been
participating on an altruistic basis, (i.e., they were participating with the
intent of providing materials or services for the benefit of demanders).
But if suppliers decide to opt out after the material (or, in the
gestational services context, the baby) has been produced and to retain
the material (or baby) for their own use, they should be required to
reimburse the expenses incurred in producing the material (or baby),
because suppliers in these circumstances have become demanders (using
materials for the production of their own children) rather than suppliers
(providing materials or services for others). This provision would guard
against opportunism on the part of persons who might otherwise have an
incentive to purport to be suppliers, then deliberately opt out in order to
produce materials (or babies) for themselves at the state's (and the
demanders') expense.
c) Information entitlementfor resultingchildren
We would also permit children who have been involved in
exchanges of materials or services-whether born from supplied
materials or gestational services, or perhaps as recipients of fetal
material-to access their medical and administrative records at the
central agency, once they have reached the age of majority. We would
not, however, permit the child to have access to the supplier's name or
other identifying information without the supplier's consent. It would,
nevertheless, seem advisable for provisions governing children produced
as a result of the new reproductive technologies to be harmonized, in
this regard, with provisions governing children adopted following natural
pregnancies.
d) Specification of characteristics
A key issue-particularly for autonomy theorists and some
feminists-is the question of which characteristics suppliers and
demanders can specify about each other. Autonomy theorists might
agree with us that it would be inappropriate to exclude persons from
participating in the market on the basis of racial or ethnic background,
socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, or marital status, 166 but might
166

See Section m(B)(2)(d)(ii),"Demand Side," above.
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add nevertheless that suppliers and demanders ought to be able to
specify their preferences in this regard and be matched accordingly. We
agree that suppliers may well be concerned about the person or persons
who will parent their genetically-related child, and demanders may well
be interested in the characteristics of the person or persons who will
contribute the genetic material for the child they will raise. But to
permit suppliers and demanders to specify race, sexual orientation,
marital status, or other attributes (such as height, eye colour, potential
abilities, or IQ), or demanders to specify whether they want a male or
female child, raises concerns about the reinforcement of negative
stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes, as well as promoting the
prospects of positive eugenics.1 67
A brief explanation of our opposition to the specification of
genetic characteristics is in order. Our own proposals are limited to the
issue of genetic "selection," which involves selecting suppliers who have
certain desired characteristics with a view to producing children who
may have those characteristics, but because genetic "selection" and the
future possibilities for manipulating the genetic material itself raise
several similar concerns, we will briefly address the latter practice
also.16
167A distinction is often drawn between "negative" eugenics, which involves the removal or
alteration of a defective gene, Le, a gene that causes a particular disease or other medical condition,
and "positive" eugenics, which involves the alteration of otherwise "normal" genes for the purpose
of "enhancing" the genetic makeup. The positive/negative distinction is clearly problematic in so far
as it posits a "normal" or neutral baseline from which categorization of manipulation as "positive"
or "negative" can be made. This baseline would appear to be, to some extent, dependent upon
moral determinations about what constitutes a "defect," thereby placing the manipulation in the
"negative" category. Although there is a broad consensus that conditions such as spina bifida and
sickle cell anemia are "defects," it is highly questionable whether a particular eye colour, racial type,
sex, or any number of other attributes of a physical or mental nature could be termed "defects."
See, for example, G. Coleman, "Genetic Engineering: Should Parents Be Allowed to Design Their
Children?" 34 How. L. 152; R.F. Chadwick, "The Perfect Baby: Introduction" in Chadwick, ed.,
Ethics,Reproductionand GeneticControl (London: Croom Helm, 1987) 93; President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Splicing
Life (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1982) (Chair: M.B. Abram);
and J. Heller, supra note 36. A further distinction is sometimes drawn between somatic gene cell
manipulation (alteration of genes that are not transmitted by the subject to offspring) and germ cell
manipulation (alteration of genes that are transmitted). A thorough discussion of the merits of
somatic cell therapy versus germ cell therapy and a discussion of the merits of the negative/positive
distinction are beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, a thorough discussion of the subject of
eugenics per se is beyond the scope of this paper. We would merely note that it is possible to
identify a small range of cases, such as serious medical conditions, that could be termed "defects,"
the correction of which could be designated an exercise of "negative" eugenics.
168 The hypothetical nature of this discussion should be noted. It is not possible, at present, to
manipulate genetic material so as to increase intelligence, athletic ability, etc. The genetic coding
for these traits is unknown, and indeed the difficulties involved in defining the concept and
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Some authors, notably Posner, argue that although the prospect
of positive eugenics (achieved either through selection of materials
produced by individuals with certain desired characteristics, or through
manipulation of genetic material) evokes images of the Nazi regime and
the breeding of "supermen" ("the Final Solution"), the contemporary
and future practice of it need not be cause for concern. 169 Posner
suggests that improvements in the attributes of human beings are
generally desirable and contends that the manipulation of genetic
material, or practices such as "screening" sperm suppliers on the basis of
physical or intellectual attributes, are unlikely to result in dramatic
changes in the "gene pool" or in the composition or values of society.
Posner bases these assertions, in part, on the assumption that the
practice of genetic manipulation is unlikely to become widespread
because most people will want their children to resemble themselves
(and will accordingly not want a "superbaby"), and because few fertile
persons will want to make use of methods of genetic alteration or
selection. Further, if the ability to conduct genetic selection and
alteration remains in the control of individuals (rather than the state),
the danger that a large, powerful, homogeneous new generation-or
army-of "supermen" will be produced, is minimal. Posner also asserts
that since the long-term consequences of genetic manipulation and
genetic selection are not currently known, it is better not to constrain
individuals' choices in this regard at present.
The validity of Posner's twin assumptions-that few people
would want to give their children attributes that they themselves do not
possess, and that the practice of genetic manipulation or selection is
unlikely to expand beyond a small number of individuals-is
questionable. From an autonomy perspective, the imposition of
demanders' preferences (for example, intellectual or physical attributes)
may compromise the autonomy of the resulting child: the demanders'
decision to "select" for or against certain characteristics could constrain
the child's autonomy by restricting the range of choices available to him
or her. Should a demander's autonomy, exercised by choosing the
characteristics of "his" child, be permitted to constrain the exercise of
the child's autonomy in pursuing her own conception of "the good life"?
Of course, it is also possible to argue that genetic selection will actually
increase the range of choices available to the resulting child, thereby
enhancing the child's autonomy. It is impossible to know what the child
herself would prefer. The choice is that of the demander, and the effects
attributes of "intelligence" demonstrate that the idea of simply identifying a discrete set of
"intelligence genes" may well be somewhat fanciful.
169
Supra note 20 at 413-14 and 429-32.
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of that choice, for better or for worse, will be felt by the child, who is the
subject of, rather than a party to, the decision. Genetic manipulation,
unlike other techniques for "improving" or "altering" children's
attributes or abilities (such as formal lessons in athletic, artistic, or
intellectual subjects, or socialization in particular religious, cultural,
community, or family environments), is irreversible and leaves no scope
for the child's own choices! 70
From a utilitarian perspective (and assuming that genetic
manipulation or selection is not confined to a very small number of
individuals), the prospect of permitting demanders to impose their
genetic preferences on the next generation of children raises the issue of
how the characteristics which are most likely to maximize aggregate
utility should be determined. Would the state be justified in setting
guidelines, or even imposing rules or quotas, to govern the number of
persons to be endowed with particular attributes, on the ground that
aggregate social utility will be maximized by a particular range or
distribution of various attributes? However, it is far from clear how a
particular range or distribution of attributes would maximize aggregate
social utility. Even if decisions about genetic selection or manipulation
were left entirely to individuals (rather than the state), could we be
confident that individual demanders' utility-maximizing decisions, if
genetic selection or manipulation were widely practised, would
necessarily maximize social utility or remain free from state
intervention? Given the irreversibility of the consequences, standard
assumptions of risk aversion at the individual level might reasonably
translate into a strategy of "minimax regret" (minimizing the possibility
of the most catastrophic consequences) at the collective level. In the
words of the Commissioners of the Royal Commission, "[s]ociety does
not have to be driven by technological change; we have choices about
how to control technologies to ensure that, if they are used, it is in
beneficial ways and in ways that avoid or minimize their adverse
consequences. 171
Permitting demanders to specify genetic characteristics also
poses several other problems. For example, by directing attention to the
possession of specific attributes, it might detract from a holistic view of
personality and human potential. It must also be recognized that
medical science has not established that characteristics or attributes such
170

An autonomy analysis would likely conclude that the child's autonomy would be enhanced
by certain applications of "negative" genetic engineering: for example, a child's autonomy would
doubtless be enhanced if she were to be born without sickle-cell anemia.
1 71
Supra note 1 at 47.
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as sexual orientation or musical or athletic ability are heritable, or that
manipulation of genetic material in order to remove or promote such
characteristics is-or ever will be-possible. Attempts to "select" for
certain characteristics on the basis of the supplier's attributes may prove
futile, particularly when a myriad of environmental circumstances, the
complex interaction of the supplier's genetic material with that of the
demander, and the interaction of various dominant and recessive genetic
traits, are taken into account. Finally, because (in our scheme) the state
is administering the matching of suppliers and demanders, it might
appear to be sanctioning or granting a measure of legitimacy to
differentiation or discrimination on the basis of such characteristics.
In addressing these concerns, we would recommend denying
suppliers and demanders the opportunity to specify characteristics. We
would, however, make an exception with regard to race. 172 Our reasons
for this exception are twofold. First, it would seem to be in keeping with
respect for the continuity of culture and tradition to allow suppliers and
demanders to specify race (for example, one could imagine a Native
supplier requesting that the material be provided only to a Native
demander or a Native demander requesting a Native supplier). Second,
in our current social climate, accustomed as we are to natural
conception, it is generally expected that a child who is born to a couple
will resemble its parents with regard to racial characteristics. If
demanders were not permitted to specify the supplier's race, one could
imagine a situation in which, for example, an Asian couple who has told
no one about their use of supplied materials gives birth to a non-Asian
child. The social reaction in such a case could cause the parents and the
child embarrassment and distress.
While the aforementioned constraints on supplier and recipient
designation may seem stringent to some, we re-emphasize the point that
such constraints pertain only to the information that may be formally
recorded. Parties who strongly desire to know more about each other
would have the option of mutually declining anonymity and choosing to
meet prior to supplying or receiving materials. 173 The availability of this
172 We also make an exception for gender selection when this is done on medical grounds,
such as when sex-linked genetic disorders are a strong possibility. We would also make exceptions
for the most clear-cut examples of "negative" eugenics, such as serious medical disorders.
173 An argument might be made that the issue of race could be dealt with by suppliers and

demanders choosing to meet prior to supplying or receiving materials. However, this would
compromise suppliers' and demanders' opportunities to choose anonymity, and could introduce

delay and transaction costs. Since we are convinced that specification of race should be viewed as a
legitimate option for suppliers and demanders, and is a subject which will be of importance to many

potential participants, we would prefer to allow participants the option of specifying race while
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option, coupled with the parties' freedom to decline to participate in the
exchange after meeting each other, effectively enables interested parties
to "screen" each other in accordance with a variety of unique subjective
factors. We acknowledge that the availability of this option has the
potential for reintroducing discrimination by the back door; however, it
could enable the parties to establish a rapport that might provide the
foundation for a relationship between the various "parents," which could
be beneficial for the resulting child. We believe that this option is a
necessary concession to the autonomy interests of suppliers and
demanders (particularly, perhaps, in the gestational services context).
Moreover, suppliers and demanders would be free to retain the
presumption of anonymity and decline the opportunity to meet.
e) Fetal tissue and specification
We would permit suppliers of fetal material, like suppliers of
other materials, to designate whether the material is to be used for
research or therapeutic purposes.1 74 While it is likely that most suppliers
and demanders of fetal material would be less concerned with the
specification of characteristics and attributes than would parties to
agreements involving the production of children, one could imagine
particular requests in rare situations (for example, one could imagine a
"pro-life" demander requesting tissue produced from a spontaneous
abortion, i.e., miscarriage). Another example might be a request by the
supplier to be informed of the demander's medical condition following
the transplant. While the vast majority of exchanges are likely to be
anonymous, some parties might want to make other arrangements. We
would retain a presumption of anonymity, but would permit alternate
arrangements to be made.
f) Exchanges within the family
It is also important to address the question of suppliers
designating recipients with whom they are already in contact, whether as
friends, acquaintances, colleagues, or family members. There is a
concern that demanders might use their relationship with potential
suppliers to pressure the latter into providing reproductive materials. In
retaining anonymity. The option of specifying race and declining anonymity would also remain
available.
1 74
This is the position taken in the Reid Report, supra note 151 at 29.
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the fetal tissue context, where a friend or family member's life may be at
stake, potential suppliers could face considerable pressure to conceive in
175
order to abort the fetus and provide the material to the demander.
Concerns about such pressures are well-known in the context of organ
and bone marrow donation, but in those circumstances potential
suppliers may well have the protection of a medical practitioner who, at
the supplier's request, could inform the family that the potential supplier
was not a good match. Because no "match" is currently considered
necessary for fetal transplants, potential suppliers of fetal material would
not have this protection. Moreover, we are of the view that a fetus is not
directly analogous to an organ, in that it is a potential human being and,
as such, is worthy of a measure of respect. To conceive a fetus for the
express purpose of aborting it seems much more morally problematic
than to provide one's own organs or bone marrow.
However, to suggest (as the Royal Commission does) 176 that
suppliers of fetal material not be permitted to designate the recipient of
the material is a difficult position to maintain. We are concerned that
women not become pregnant in order to abort the fetus for transplant
purposes, but there is no way of knowing whether that was indeed the
case. It is not possible to divine women's motivations for conception or
abortion, and were it possible, it would seem to be an undesirable
intrusion on a woman's right to make her own reproductive decisions.
And while families and friends have the potential to exert undue
pressure on potential suppliers, their plight may also elicit genuine
altruism. It would seem anomalous to suggest that suppliers be
permitted to provide fetal material to strangers, but not to their own
family members or friends. In the context of other reproductive
materials, it would also seem odd to allow (as would the Royal
Commission) a woman to donate a spare ovum to a stranger, but not to
her own sisterj 77 While we are sensitive to the concern expressed by
Janice Raymond that "altruism" may be suspect 178 in a society where
175 Supra note 1 at 999-1000. Some might be prompted to wonder whether exchanges of fetal
material within the family might occur, given the current availability of fetal material from
unintentional pregnancies that ended in abortion. We would hypothesize that if the "abortion pill"
(RU 486; mifepristone) were to become available in Canada, the availability of fetal material could
decline significantly. If treatments using fetal material become more widespread, demand would
rise. If these eventualities materialize before fetal-tissue-culture practices develop to the point
where substantial amounts of tissue can be produced and sustained, it would seem reasonable to
anticipate a shortage of fetal material.
176 ibid. at 1000.
177
178

bid. at 592-93 and c. 21.
Supra note 114.
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there are many pressures on women to subordinate their own desires to
the needs of others, be it family, friends, or children, we must also
respect women's right to have abortions, or participate in the supply of
reproductive materials or gestational services, for their own reasons.
The task of deciding on an appropriate response to this tension has
presented us with acute difficulties, as we have found both feminist and
autonomy concerns-as well as concerns about respect for the
fetus--compelling.
Permitting recipient designation, while establishing certain
safeguards (to be discussed in more detail in Part IV, below) to increase
the likelihood that suppliers' choices are as informed, voluntary, and
reflective of suppliers' true preferences as is possible in our current
society, would seem to us to be a reasonable compromise. While a
thorough exploration of the meaning of "informed consent" would take
us beyond the scope of this paper, we would suggest that, at a minimum,
suppliers and demanders be provided with information about the
potential psychological consequences of the exchange. We would also
make non-directive counselling, designed to facilitate discussion and
thorough exploration of the consequences and implications of
participation in the exchange, mandatory rather than optional. The nonwaivable right to an "opt-out" period as discussed above is yet another
safeguard.
g) Computermatching
The process of pairing suppliers with demanders-according to
race, if requested, or by preferences for anonymity or for prior or
continuing contact-could be accomplished by establishing a computer
matching system. Such a system could be administered by the central
agency mentioned above. Individual clinics could counsel and assist
potential suppliers and demanders in providing information, and the
data could be entered into a central computer system. It is likely that a
clinic serving a particular ethnic or cultural group in the population
would serve many people who are eventually matched. However, in
some cases, particularly when the supplier and demander want to remain
anonymous, a match could be obtained from a distant location and the
materials could be transported. If queues develop, individuals could
decide whether to wait, to explore other options, or to change their
declared preferences.
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4. The principle of fair access
On the demand side, some state subsidization of the use of
reproductive technologies, supplied materials, storage facilities, and
drugs is essential to ensure access by demanders of all socioeconomic
groups. But in line with our first principle (of uniqueness), we do not
recommend that use of the new reproductive technologies be funded in
the same manner as health care services under the state health care plan.
We justify subjecting users of the new reproductive technologies,
materials, and services to special financial arrangements, because the
production of children by artificial means differs significantly from (and
is not "necessary" or therapeutic in the same sense as) the health- and
life-sustaining procedures traditionally and currently covered by the
state health care plan.1 79 We suggest that demanders be asked to pay on
a sliding scale for their use of the technologies per se, materials, drugs
(which should be included since these are a major expense), and storage
facilities, and the costs of pregnancy in the gestational services context.
The state would heavily subsidize the use of materials, technologies, etc.,
by poorer persons, while well-off persons would be required to pay the
full cost. Persons whose use of the technologies is self-regarding, i.e.,
persons who require no materials to be supplied, would also be required
to pay on a sliding scale and to comply with limits on the number of
times that materials and technologies may be used.
The use of fetal material would be an exception to the sliding
scale: we would recommend that the state health care plan cover the full
cost of fetal tissue procurement and transplant medications and
procedures, since fetal tissue transplants (like organ transplants and
blood transfusions) may be medically necessary to preserve the
demander's own life. With regard to the supply of fetal material, we
would recommend that publicly-funded abortions be available to all
women. This would remove the concern that women who could not

179 The Royal Commission came to a different conclusion on this issue. The Commission
recommended the inclusion of the new reproductive technologies within the state health care plan,
subject to qualifications with regard to evidence of the medical effectiveness (and, in some cases,
cost-effectiveness) of particular technologies and services. The Commission, supra note 1 at 716,
took the position that "[t]he ability to have children is not a luxury or a frill, so that effective assisted
conception services for people who are infertile are as or more important than many other services
already provided in the health care system." Not to extend full coverage to these services would, in
the Commission's opinion, create a "two-tier system, in which access to services depends on ability
to pay." The Commission does not seem to have considered the possibility of using a sliding scale:
see c. 20,24, andpassim.
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afford an abortion might be induced to supply fetal material for research
or therapeutic purposes by the prospect of receiving a free abortion.
Expense is an important concern, even with partial contributions
in the gamete, zygote, and gestational services contexts by better-off
individuals. It is important that the state determine what proportion of
health care resources ought to be devoted to the technologies and which
of the technologies are cost-effective.180 Limits could be set on the
number of times a demander could make use of the technologies, or on
the number of children produced. Medical factors, such as a very low
probability of success, could also be used to limit the number of
demanders. These limits should also be applied to persons whose use of
the technologies is self-regarding. The state would also need to
determine what proportion of medical research resources ought to be
devoted to the technologies.
One example of an institutional mechanism for establishing such
priorities and balancing the relevant societal, group, and individual
interests has been proposed by the Royal Commission.1 81 The
Commission advocates a "National Reproductive Technologies
Commission," independent of government and composed of
professionals from a variety of disciplines and lay members representing
the community, which would establish comprehensive policies and
practices in this field. The proposed Commission would set national
licensing standards for infertility treatment services and research; gather,
analyze, and store information on technologies, services, and outcomes;
assist and enable co-operation between the provinces and levels of
government; keep pace with emerging technologies, techniques, and
services; and promote data collection, analysis, public education, and
research into the causes and prevention of infertility.
A key way to reduce the number of demanders, and to ensure
that those who are involved are aware of the implications of their
participation, is to provide prospective demanders with comprehensive
information. From an autonomy perspective, it is preferable to give
individuals information to facilitate their own preferences than to
impose external constraints. An important topic would be the
alternatives to having one's "own" (genetically-related) child. While
trying to decide whether to use the technologies, or while waiting,
prospective parents could explore alternatives and decide whether they
are certain that they want to participate.
1 80

]bid.at c. 4.

181 Ibid. at Recommendation 1 and c. 5, "Executive Summary and Overview of
Recommendations."
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IV. APPLICATIONS
In this section, we propose what we believe should be the central
elements of any regulatory regime governing exchanges involving
gametes and zygotes, gestational services, or fetal tissue. Our task here
is to apply the four governing principles developed in Section III.
A.. GametesAnd Zygotes
In accordance with our fourth principle (fair access), the cost of
gamete and zygote use would not be borne entirely by the state health
care system, but would rather be supplemented by payments from
demanders on the basis of a sliding scale. On the supply side, in
accordance with our second principle (enablement, not inducement),
donors would be reimbursed both for their expenses and their time; the
latter at a rate below minimum wage, such as $5 per hour. Payment by
the hour is, in this context, preferable to lump-sum payments because it
is more adequately tailored to the actual amount of time contributed.
Also, a lump sum may have an inducement effect on suppliers who may
excessively discount the time commitment due to an unfamiliarity with
the technologies, medical testing, and administrative procedures. Only
de novo suppliers ought to be paid for time and expenses involved in
procuring the material: money payments are to enable altruistic donors
to donate by compensating them for expenses which they would not
otherwise have incurred, not to compensate suppliers of spares who
would have incurred these costs in any event. Nevertheless, both
suppliers of spares and de novo suppliers would be reimbursed for costs
directly associated with the administrative organization of the donation
and medical screening procedures.
We recommend that both women and men be allowed to donate
materials and receive compensation according to the aforementioned
non-inducing rate of payment. It seems anomalous to suggest, as does
the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, that women
should not be permitted to donate ova de novo.182 The Commissioners
assert that it is not "ethical" to "permit" an "invasive surgical procedure,
with its attendant risks, on an otherwise healthy woman for the benefit
of someone else, particularly in the absence of information about the

182 Ibid at Recommendation 166 and c. 21.
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long-term effects of these procedures."183 But these arguments could
also be applied to organ donation and even some research
studies-procedures which women are "permitted" to undergo. Also, if
information about the long-term medical consequences of ova retrieval
is absent, why are women permitted to undergo ova retrieval at all?
Should not self-regarding situations also be prohibited? And, if ova
retrieval is permitted, surely its invasiveness and accompanying risks are
concerns best remedied by requiring participants to be adequately
informed, not by banning de novo donation absolutely. As regards
sperm donors, the Royal Commission would provide them with all
relevant information and compensate them at a non-inducing rate for
their "time and inconvenience;"' 18 4 male donors would be permitted to
make their own choices. We therefore argue that, although the
procedure and risks for de novo ova donors are significantly different
from those involved in sperm donation, women should also be entitled to
make their own choices.
Suppliers and demanders would both need to be provided with
full information about the relevant physical and psychological risks
entailed in the activities. Both should be screened to ensure that they
meet appropriate medical and psychological standards. With regard to
ova donation (and also the provision of gestational services), instead of
paying women to accept &xante risks, such as developing ovarian cancer,
infection, etc., we would hold the state strictly liable for harm caused by
the drugs or procedures involved, i.e., the state would be liable on proof
of causation rather than negligence. This would ensure that of all the
ova donors and gestational service providers who incur the risk of
subsequent harm, only those for whom the risk materializes would be
compensated, and they would be compensated fully.
Suppliers and demanders would be matched through a central
computer system in keeping with their preferences for anonymity or
meeting ex ante or expost, among other factors. Also, again in keeping
with our desire to avoid inducement effects and the concomitant risks of
differentiation or discrimination on the basis of racial characteristics, we
would forbid differential pricing: public appeals for donors from certain
groups might be permissible if supply shortages were acute, but all
donors who volunteer and meet the standard criteria should be accepted
and compensated for their expenses at the same rate.

183 ]bid, at 591-92.
184

bid. at 448. See also Recommendation 88(k) and c. 19.
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The autonomy of suppliers would be respected by the
establishment of an "opt-out" period during which they could change
their minds about the provision or disposition of the supplied materials.
Up until the point when the materials are used, suppliers could require a
change in the disposition of the materials, i.e., they could require that
the materials be used for research rather than procreation, or that the
materials be destroyed. This "opt-out" period is of even greater
importance in the gestational services context.
Storage issues must also be addressed. We propose that
individuals or couples sign a form setting out their wishes should any of a
set of eventualities, such as divorce, death, etc., occur. It would seem
appropriate to establish a set of background rules on these issues (for
example, in the event of divorce, the materials are to be donated rather
than used by one of the former spouses), which individuals and couples
could contract around. We also recommend that there be limits on the
number of gametes and zygotes that any individual can store; this is
designed to guard against concerns about the social costs of overuse of
the technologies. Also, the possibilities for "stockpiling" genetic
material, bequeathing gametes and zygotes in wills, and bringing into the
world children whose genetic parents died many years previously, lead us
to suggest a time limitation on storage of materials after which the
materials would be disposed of according to the wishes expressed in the
initial form. Donation to another individual for immediate use,
destruction, or donation for research purposes would be the three
available alternatives. The Royal Commission recommends that
decisions about the disposition of materials be made before gametes are
obtained or zygotes created, and recommends that zygotes not be stored
for a period in excess of five years or after the death of one of the
gamete suppliersls 5
Imposing a limitation period would also likely bring about an
increase in the supply of materials, since some persons would
presumably choose to donate, rather than destroy, their materials at the
end of the limitation period. However, any materials that are donated
would still have to be used in keeping with the rule limiting the number
of children that can be genetically parented by one person.
With regard to reproductive materials not subject to long-term
storage issues, since the state would have authority over the receipt,
storage, allocation, and distribution of materials for reproductive
purposes, it would also seem reasonable to entrust the state with the

185 id. at Recommendations 170, 171, and c. 21.
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allocation of gametes and zygotes for research purposes. It would be
important to establish a mode of allocation to ensure that the demands
of individuals and those of research interests are both met. It is unlikely
that research interests would have difficulty acquiring a sufficient supply
of materials, since some donors are likely to prefer that their genetic
material be used for research rather than the creation of children for
others. Also, research interests do not ordinarily require gametes or
zygotes from donors of, for example, a particular race, and some
researchers can make use of donated materials that are damaged,
chromosomally abnormal, etc.
B. GestationalServices
It is clear to us that in this context certain background legal
entitlements must be firmly secured. This is particularly important on
the supply side, where concerns are widely held about the potential for
women's exploitation as gestational service suppliers. In accordance
with many of these concerns, we advocate two important safeguards for
these women. The first is that the birth mother ought to be legally
presumed to be the child's mother.18 6 The second is that the birth
mother have an absolute right to "opt out" of the gestational service
arrangement after the child's birth within a given time period, in which
case she would retain full custody of the child.187 The birth mother's
right to be presumed the child's mother would terminate at the end of
the opt-out period, if the woman does not choose to opt out of the
agreement within this period.
These two absolute entitlements respect many of the concerns
identified in the various normative frameworks above. Distributive
justice concerns, for example, identify the dangers of women of c6lour or
of the Third World being exploited as gestational carriers of others'
genetic material, without the same rights as those held by women who
give birth following natural pregnancies. Ensuring that these women are
legally held to be the mothers of the children they gestate will provide
them with a minimum safeguard against such racial exploitation, by
ensuring that they are presumptively held to be the mothers of the
186 This would mean that the providers of the genetic material (the commissioning
individuals) would not be legally presumed to be the parents of the child until the exphy of the optout period.
187 This would be subject, of course, to the standard unfitness caveat of social welfare
legislation: see infra note 189 and accompanying text.
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children they bear (regardless of their lack of genetic contribution), with
all of the rights and obligations that natural maternity entails. Women
are less likely to be objectified and treated as mere "breeders" if they
possess full control over the disposition of the child to whom they give
birth. And with this protection, some conception of a unified
"motherhood" will be retained, in line with some feminist concerns.
Birth mothers may tend to underestimate the bonding process
that takes place during gestation-a process which may render them
unprepared to give the child to others after its birth. Allowing these
women the right to opt out of the agreement once the baby is born
means that these mothers will be able to reassess their judgment of the
arrangement's implications for them in the light of their evolving feelings
and information. While an opt-out right creates additional risks for
commissioning individuals, it strengthens incentives for more careful
screening of prospective birth mothers to ensure that they are informed
about the nature of the agreement, and are emotionally stable and
psychologically prepared to undertake the commitment of providing
gestational services.
Martha Field, among others, has proposed an approach to this
issue which is appealing to us.188 Field would establish a presumption
that the birth mother be entitled to keep the child, should she so elect,
on the basis that at the date of birth the mother and baby will be bonded
much more closely than father and baby.189 By analogy with adoption
rules, Field would provide a short period after birth for the birth mother
to repudiate the gestational service agreement (subject to an unfitness
caveat as defined in current child welfare laws, which applies to all
parents). Current Ontario adoption law prohibits a birth mother from
giving consent to an adoption until seven days after the baby's birth;
three weeks are then provided within which the birth mother can change
her mind.190 We suggest that this four-week period is an appropriate
one to apply in the context of gestational service agreements.
Establishing these presumptions would not only respect the autonomy of
the birth mother to make her own decision in light of changing emotions
and information, but would also avoid the uncertainty and psychological
188 Supra note 145.
189 Once the birth mother's custody is assured in this manner, the question of paternal
visitation rights would need to be addressed. Our position is that these visitation rights should not
be recognized once a birth mother has opted out of the gestational service arrangement. Anything
less would defeat the very purpose of the opt-out clause, and would also create the potential for
future litigation that may be harmful to the child.
190 See, for example, the Child andFamily ServicesAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. 11, s. 137(8).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 32 No. 4

trauma for all parties to the agreement of custody litigation, and
particularly the damaging publicity and uncertainty that may impair the
future well-being of the child-a real "cost" of gestational service
agreements that ought to be avoided in the interests of the children
involved1 91
Once the child is born, however, and the opt-out period has
elapsed, we recommend that the gestational service agreement be fully
enforceable-that is to say, that the transfer of custody be enforced and
maintained. By this point, the birth mother will have decided that she is
prepared to give up the child, and the child's life with its new parents
must be free to begin. The contact which might then ensue between the
child and its birth mother would be up to the birth mother and the
commissioning individuals to determine together. This determination
would have to take place at the time of the original agreement, and
would be subject to modification at a later date if both parties had
agreed ex ante to leave this option open by, for example, exchanging
identifying information.
As was the case with gamete and zygote exchanges, we propose
that a central registry of potential participants be established; perhaps
the same registry could be used in conjunction with all reproductive
technologies. Potential suppliers and demanders 192 would participate in
the screening procedures 93 outlined above, and be provided with
comprehensive information about the gestational service scheme. This
would include information about all costs and risks associated with the
process, and the gestational mother's right to opt out of the scheme.
Once both demanders and suppliers had made their desires known to a
licensed agency, the central registry of interested parties could be used
to "match" suppliers with corresponding demanders in accordance with
their declared preferences.
A number of further substantive questions must also be
addressed. First, ought a gestating mother be free to undergo an
191 We concede that this "cost" could also be avoided by a strict parental presumption in
favour of the father. For the reasons we have outlined, however, we believe that it is in the child's
interest for custody to be presumptively granted to its mother.
192 We would require that all demanders of gestational services be medically incapable of
gestation. We are uncomfortable with the thought of men and women using a gestational service
arrangement purely for convenience, because they themselves do not want to take the time and
effort to conceive and gestate a child.
193
Examples of the kind of questions that would need to be addressed in counselling, for both
the gestational mother and the commissioning individuals, are provided in M. Harrison,
"Psychological Ramifications of 'Surrogate Motherhood'" in N.L Stotland, ed., PsychiatricAspects
of Reproductive Technology (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1990) 97.
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abortion without the consent of the commissioning individuals? Since
natural mothers in other relationships now ,have such a right
independent of their partners, 194 we believe that the position should be
no different in the case of women choosing to gestate for others.1 95 This
conclusion is entirely consistent with the autonomy of birth mothers and
also with many feminist concerns that pregnancy is a particularly
woman-centred process, and that the fetus ought consequently not to be
seen as the "property" of the commissioning individuals.
Commissioning individuals would also have to accept the risk of a
gestational mother miscarrying the fetus. Since the birth mother would
not be profiting financially from the termination of the pregnancy, there
would be no cause for commissioning individuals to complain of undue
enrichment on her part.
The autonomy principle in this context would also seem to
dictate that a birth mother should be allowed to control decisions made
in regard to her body and the fetus during her pregnancy; that is to say
that she ought not to be forced against her will to undergo any medical
tests or treatments.19 6 A more difficult issue is the extent to which her
drug-taking, drinking, smoking, or eating habits might be controlled
Certain commissioning individuals will
during the pregnancy.
undoubtedly seek to impose restrictions on these forms of behaviour by
the gestational mother during the pregnancy. While women might be
encouraged to abide by some of these restrictions, we believe strongly
that a pregnant woman ought never to be compelled to conduct her life
in a certain way. To attempt to legally compel a pregnant woman to, for
example, refrain from drinking alcohol or smoking cigarettes during her
pregnancy would not only run contrary to the traditional refusal of
courts to compel specific performance in personal service contracts, but
would also conjure up visions of extreme scenarios in which the
commissioning individuals hire detectives to spy on the gestational
mother and attempt to confiscate alcohol and cigarettes in her
possession. We would hold any promises with regard to refraining from
activities such as smoking or drinking to be legally unenforceable, and a
breach thereof as providing no grounds for repudiation of the
agreement.
If the commissioning individuals should change their minds
about the arrangement during pregnancy or before transfer of the child,

19 4 Daigle v. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
195
Sorkow . took this position in the Baby M trial,supra note 8 at 1159.
196 See Andrews, supranote 37 at 365-66.
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for example, because the wife of an adoptive couple has become
pregnant unexpectedly, or the adoptive parents have separated, or the
child is born disabled, or is in some other way unacceptable to the
commissioning individuals, they will not be free to renounce the child.
It would be extremely harsh to leave the child "parentless." The
commissioning individuals, like natural parents, must accept the risks of
conceiving or helping to conceive a child in circumstances different from
those previously intended or desired. Like any other parents, they would
then have the option to put that child up for (subsequent) adoption if
they felt unable to adequately care for it.
Another important issue is that of payment to suppliers. It is
over this question that the most emotional and divisive debate has taken
place on the subject of gestational service arrangements. As we have
described above, our proposed regime of "constrained" commodification
would prohibit women from being induced to provide their gestational
services for financial reward. Any calculation of a compensation
payment will be controversial. In the case of gestational service sale, the
women most vulnerable to financial inducement are likely to be those of
lower or middle incomes who are at home looking after their children,
because these women are the ones most likely to have the time and
flexibility to provide gestational service at low opportunity costs. In
order to be faithful to our guiding principles, it is crucial that our
payment scheme not induce these women to become gestational-service
providers. Beyond compensation for basic out-of-pocket costs (for
example, medical and transportation expenses), we propose the payment
of a modest lump sum figure set at a level slightly below minimum wage
opportunity costs, which might be approximately $5,000 (adjusted
annually for inflation). Payment is suggested as a lump sum, despite the
concerns noted in Section III, above, because per-hour estimates are
difficult to calculate in the gestational services context due to the fact
that a woman is "working" twenty-four hours per day to gestate the
child, but she is also free during much of that time to perform other
tasks. This is not the case in the gamete, zygote, and fetal tissue
donation context, where we suggest that suppliers be paid on an hourly
basis.
With respect to demand-side payment for gestational services,
our fourth principle (fair access) dictates that the cost of this service be
paid for on a sliding scale, depending on the means of demanders.
We anticipate that under our system conditions will be similar to
those obtaining currently, in that there will be more demanders for
gestational services than suppliers. The anticipated disparity between
the number of suppliers relative to demanders will undoubtedly lead to
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some queuing by demanders, and strict efforts must be made to ensure
fair and equal access. To this end, the number of times any one
commissioning individual should be able to engage the services of a
197
gestational mother should probably be limited to one birth.
C. Fetal Tissue
To discuss the specifics of our proposed regulatory regime, we
will look at the supply and demand sides separately. On the supply side,
the issue of payment is of greatest importance, since we are concerned
not to offer women financial inducements to overcome their moral
convictions with regard to the disposition of their fetuses or the
sustaining of a pregnancy.
Fetal tissue could be produced in three different scenarios: a
woman could intentionally become pregnant in order to abort the fetus
and provide fetal tissue, or she could decide to abort a fetus that she had
formerly intended to keep, or she could have been intending to have an
abortion for personal reasons and subsequently decide to supply the
tissue. Given the substantial number of elective abortions currently
performed, the last scenario seems likely to be the most common source
of fetal tissue. In practice, distinguishing between these three scenarios
is difficult, because it requires an inquiry into the woman's motives
which is neither practicable nor desirable.1 98 This difficulty is
exacerbated by the fact that each of the three possible scenarios would
seem to require a different level of compensation, in keeping with the
principle that suppliers should be compensated for opportunity costs and
incidental expenses connected with the supply of materials (for example,
women who became pregnant in order to supply the tissue would need
to be compensated from the inception of the pregnancy, while women
whose decision to abort was independent of the possibility of tissue
donation would only need to be compensated for time spent in
administrative procedures with regard to the donation). In keeping with
our guiding principles and in the interests of avoiding a motive-based
19 7

We would suggest that gestational mothers who are contributing their genetic material be
governed by the same provisions that govern in the context of gamete and zygote supply: namely,
that they be limited to the production of ten genetically-related children, including children that
they produce for themselves.
198 In addition, a governmental scheme which requires an inquiry as to intent at the time of
conception or abortion might constitute an unconstitutional invasion of the privacy of the woman
involved. See J.M. Hillebrecht, "Regulating the Clinical Use of Fetal Tissue" (1989) 10 . Legal
Med. 269 at 285.
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scheme, we would provide compensatory payment to all suppliers at the
level of the lowest-paying scenario: namely, the donation of tissue
produced from an abortion that would have taken place in any event
(this is analogous to the situation with regard to "spare" zygotes,
outlined earlier). This payment would be nominal. It would not cover
the cost of the abortion (which presumably would have taken place
regardless of the decision to supply tissue and would be covered under
the state health care system), but would cover the administrative costs
surrounding the supply of the tissue (including incidental costs of, for
example, child care during the administrative procedures).
The timing of consent to donation is important. Women should
be asked whether they are willing to supply the fetal tissue after they
have decided to abort, but prior to the abortion itself.19 9 There are a
number of reasons why consent must be obtained before the abortion
occurs. These include the need to transport and utilize the tissue soon
after the abortion; 200 the possibility that post-abortion consent could be
affected by anaesthesia used during the abortion 201 and the possibility
that the emotional effects of the abortion itself might influence consent
given after the abortion 02
The provision of information regarding the possibility of
donation, and the obtaining of consent, would take place after the
decision to abort is made, unless the woman requests such information
earlier. 203 Adequate time to make both independent decisions (the
decision to abort and the decision to supply the fetal tissue) should be
allowed. There would be separate consent forms for the abortion and
fetal disposition.2 04
The potential supplier would need to be provided with all
relevant information concerning the tissue "donation," and the need for
information would be especially acute when suppliers are asked to
undergo more dangerous abortion techniques, or to postpone the
abortion in order to obtain more useable tissue. Suppliers would be
199

See also G.J. Annas & S. Elias, "The Politics of Transplantation of Human Fetal Tissue"
(1989) 320 New Eng. J. Med. 1079 at 1082.
200 J.F. Childress, "Ethics, Public Policy, and Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research"
(June 1991) Kennedy Inst. Ethics J. 93 at 114.
201 U.K, H.C., "Review of the Guidance on the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material"
Cmnd 762 in SessionalPapers(1989) at 6.5.
202
Robertson, supra note 27 at 469, note 80.
203

Childress,supra note 200 at 115.

204

See Royal Commission, supra note 1 at 997-98, for similar recommendations.
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screened in accordance with medical and psychological criteria tailored
to the fetal tissue donation context. And while the vast majority of fetal
tissue exchanges are likely to be anonymous, matching may occur where,
for example, parties would like to meet ex ante or expost or where the
supplier would like to be advised of the demander's condition expost.
Suppliers would be entitled to determine whether the tissue is to
be used for research or therapeutic purposes. They would also be
permitted to opt out of the donation until such time as the tissue is
actually used (or so long as the usefulness of the material is not
compromised) 205 However, such a right may become illusory if the time
between donation and processing (at which point the identifiability of
the tissue may be compromised) is medically required to be short. If
medically feasible, we would be in favour of a regime which allowed for a
period of a few days subsequent to donation during which time the
supplier would be able to opt out and ask that her tissue be destroyed or
used for another purpose (such as research rather than therapeutic
application).
On the demand side, adequate information must be provided to
potential recipients before the decision to undergo a fetal tissue
transplant is made. Information regarding specific risks and the
difficulty of quantifying the risks associated with such an experimental
procedure must be made available.206 As noted previously, the source of
the tissue, which is almost always elective abortions, must be disclosed to
2 07
potential recipients, who may find abortion morally abhorrent
Additionally, all demanders would be screened in accordance with
medical and psychological criteria to assess their physiological
amenability to the transplant and their psychological perspective on the
subject. Since fetal tissue is a potentially life-saving resource, it should
be allocated on the basis of medical need and utility, and these decisions
can only be made by qualified medical personnel.

205 An opportunity to withdraw consent after the abortion has taken place is recommended by
Annas and Elias, supranote 198 at 1082.
206 Morgan, supra note 62 at 144 and 149. The first fetal tissue transplant in Canada was
performed in December 1991 at Victoria General Hospital in Halifax. It is estimated that only 3 to
4 per cent of persons suffering from Parkinson's disease would be eligible candidates for the
transplant procedures, although it is hoped that techniques and scientific knowledge will be
enhanced to a point at which many more patients can be helped: D. Jones, "Halifax Hospital First in
Canada to Proceed with Controversial Fetal Tissue Transplant" (1992) 146:3 Can. Med. A.. 389 at
389-90.
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(1989) 4 J.L. & Health at 80.
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With regard to payment on the demand side, since the
transplantation of fetal tissue is therapeutic in nature, the cost of the
transplant should be borne by the state health care system. Due to the
cost of the accompanying technologies and the time and resources
required to make use of them-doctors, nurses, medical personnel,
equipment, etc.-careful decisions will need to be made with regard to
the appropriate proportion of the health care budget to be devoted to
this type of therapeutic intervention.
The procedural aspects of the donation, and the transplantation
and research applications of fetal tissue, would be regulated according to
the following scheme. The collection of fetal tissue from abortion clinics
and hospitals would be performed by retrieval agencies. At some point
in the future, the presence of for-profit tissue processing companies in
Canada may become a factor.208 These companies could be paid a fee to
process and proliferate the fetal tissue obtained from the non-profit
retrieval agencies. The tissue would then be allocated to hospitals using
a national allocation computer database, which would contain
information on all potential recipients of fetal tissue and their medical
needs. Tissue would also be allocated for research purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
Given strongly held and opposing views as to which normative
perspective represents the most appropriate framework for evaluating
the new reproductive technologies, given the possibilities for the
commercialization of reproductive materials and services that these
technologies entail, and given that many individuals are likely to feel
simultaneously attracted to the values inherent in several of these
perspectives and to feel internally torn over the value conflicts which
they present, we have attempted to sympathetically engage various
perspectives in proposing a set of guiding principles that seem to reflect
basic and cogent moral intuitions on the central issues that the subject
presents. In this context, where the effects of alternative policies are
currently so much a matter of empirical conjecture, it seems appropriate
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A fetal tissue processing company isolates the required cells from the fetal tissue obtained
from non-profit retrieval agencies and causes the cells to proliferate so that small amounts of fetal
tissue can be used for many patients: Burlingame, supra note 3 at 221. In addition, the company
processes the fetal tissue in order to decrease the possibility of rejection of the tissue by the
recipient-host. "[B]ecause fetal tissue is genetically simple and immunologically undeveloped,
laboratory processes can eliminate the few structures that could trigger immune responses in
recipients": ibiti
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to proceed with considerable caution; in other words, to adopt a strategy
of "minimax regret." This means that policies should be designed to
foreclose the more catastrophic or socially destructive possibilities that
can plausibly be envisaged. Accordingly, we have attempted to strike a
balance between individual choice and (we hope) avoidance of the more
extreme and possibly negative consequences of unconstrained market
activity, by leaving open the possibility of participation in exchange
relationships with regard to use of the new reproductive technologies
under a constrained set of conditions. We believe that such a strategic
policy orientation reflects a perfectly sensible recognition of the kind of
risk aversion that influences most individuals in making their own life
plans. Our choice of regulatory principles with regard to the appropriate
role for commercialization of reproductive materials and services, and
the applications of these principles in the three exchange scenarios
reviewed, are heavily influenced by this general strategic orientation. In
this respect, and in the context of the new reproductive technologies, we
reject the largely unconstrained role for markets espoused by Richard
Posner, who is of the view that although the prospect of positive
eugenics is "ominous" (more so than negative eugenics), "its macrosocial
effects lie many decades, perhaps centuries, in the future, and since we
do not know whether those effects are likely to be on balance good or
bad, it seems idle to worry about them now.' 209 This view seems to
ignore the virtues of marginal change in venturing forth into new and
uncharted social domains and of preserving maximum capacity for policy
reversibility or modification in the light of accumulating experience.
There seems to be little doubt that the new reproductive
technologies, and some of their more extreme implications, such as
genetic engineering and selective insemination and implantation of
genetic material, will pose some of the most morally anguishing and
potentially socially divisive issues that we are likely to face as a
community in the decades ahead. We are under no illusions that in this
paper we have been able to offer any simple normative talisman or
correlative legal rules that can guide us to the light on the distant shore.
As H.L. Mencken once remarked, for every complex problem there is a
solution that is neat, plausible, and wrong. Our proposals in this paper
have attempted to take seriously this cautionary wisdom.
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Posner, supra note 20 at 432.

